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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explore the method and content of Joseph Ratzinger’s 
aesthetics from a philosophical perspective. Ratzinger takes up Plato’s description 
of man’s encounter with beauty as a wounding by the power of eros, and argues 
that the involvement of emotion in this experience does not render it irrational, 
but rather, stresses that the feeling of beauty is in accordance with logos, since the 
domain of logos reaches far beyond abstract processes of reasoning. Moreover, 
Ratzinger rejects the notion that beauty is simply a cover over what is 
fundamentally ugly. According to Ratzinger, beauty is the foundation of reality 
because it is convertible with logos, which after all, is not simply unchanging 
being, but also person, that is, Jesus of Nazareth, who ultimately reveals beauty as 
truth and love in the form of both eros and agape.  
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Introduction 
  
The consideration of beauty in Western culture has been moving away from the 
context of transcendental metaphysics since the time of Descartes.
1
 Today, beauty 
may be thought of as an emotional response to meaningless sensory stimuli, 
which is an aesthetic attitude much indebted to David Hume, while others may 
relegate beauty to the subjective realm as described by Immanuel Kant.
2
 After 
Kant, we come across various aesthetic theories associated with an understanding 
of beauty as an immanent concept subservient to the human will. For instance, 
Friedrich Nietzsche takes up Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimistic thoughts on the 
power of the will and transforms it to claim that the chaotic frenzy of the 
Dionysian element is the ultimate aesthetic principle. Finally, following the 
atrocious massacres of the Twentieth Century, Theodor Adorno proposes that 
ugliness is the ultimate reality of which beauty is a privation.
3
  
Joseph Ratzinger reflects on these philosophical arguments and considers whether 
they are valid.
4
 He does not dismiss them out of hand, but asks the same questions 
addressed by the various philosophers: is beauty really a metaphysical reality? Is 
                                                             
1 Arthur Pontynen, For the Love of Beauty: Art, History, and the Moral Foundations of Aesthetic 
Judgment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 303. 
2  Nick Zangwill, "Aesthetic Realism 1," in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold 
Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 78; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 119, 43. 
3  Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and 
Dionysus," in Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts, ed. Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. 
Conway (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 58-61; Peter Uwe 
Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art Adorno's Aesthetic Theory Revisited (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), 94. 
4
 Joseph Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty," Message to the 
Communion and Liberation (CL) meeting at Rimini (24-30 August), (2002), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020824
_ratzinger-cl-rimini_en.html. 
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it not simply emotional and hence irrational and subjective? Is it not a means of 
deception and a show of power? Finally, like Adorno, Ratzinger ponders upon the 
suffering of humanity, and asks whether it is not ugliness that is the ultimate 
foundation of existence.
5
 In this thesis, I will argue that Ratzinger is able to 
respond to these questions in favour of a new understanding of beauty by his 
openness to three sources of knowledge: (1) philosophy, engaging with both 
modern philosophical aesthetics as well as classical metaphysics, (2) theology, 
with particular emphasis on the thought of Augustine, and (3) personal experience, 
reflected in his recounts of profound encounters with beauty in art and worship.  
For Ratzinger, beauty is united with truth and goodness and these together 
constitute the metaphysical transcendentals. He explains, however, that there is 
something missing in the Ancient Greek metaphysical understanding of beauty, 
which is made utterly obvious by Adorno’s existential critique that after the 
Holocaust there can be no real beauty. Ratzinger reveals that a response to this 
can only come from a project founded on a close relationship between philosophy 
and theology, which then allows one to see that beauty is not only experienced in 
the Platonic sense of transcendental participation, but most splendidly made 
known in the icon of the crucified Jesus, whose paradoxical beauty embraces pain 
and ugliness.
6
 The understanding of beauty as a transcendental in the classical 
metaphysical sense is therefore surpassed by a beauty that has a face and a name. 
Beauty, then, is a way for us to encounter this person, and yet this person is both 
logos and love. The equivalence between person and being in beauty ultimately 
has a profound impact on how we understand our own being as persons.
7
  
  
                                                             
5
 Ibid., §5. 
6 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §19. 
7 Credo for Today: What Christians Believe, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2009), 126. 
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Structure 
 
The first chapter considers the problems anticipated in a philosophical enquiry 
into the aesthetics of a theologian. Frankly, it can be said that a philosophical 
enquiry into Ratzinger’s works is justified because his theology is founded on 
philosophical thoughts and methods.
8
 In fact, it is Ratzinger himself who asserts 
that philosophy and theology are necessarily interdependent.
9
 According to 
Ratzinger, the aim of philosophy is to question, not for the sake of questioning, 
but rather in order to arrive at an answer.
10
 At the same time, it is the nature of 
philosophy to seek answers which are unattainable by reason alone. Ratzinger 
argues that philosophy must not shy away from discussing such realities as man’s 
mortality, but in order to discuss such profound human realities philosophy needs 
a starting point, and this where theology becomes indispensable.
11
 This 
relationship is reciprocal, for theology is unable to reflect on revelation and 
express itself without the help of philosophical reasoning.
12
  
Briefly, then, the first part of the thesis considers Ratzinger’s aesthetics in relation 
to classical and medieval metaphysics. The beauty of creation is a pathway to 
God who is the true beauty of being and the source of all beauty.
13
 This ascent 
from the experience of beauty in created things to the contemplation of the divine 
is fostered by eros which unifies man in his own being.
14
 Finally, the 
                                                             
8 Cf. Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 5-6. 
9 Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 139. 
10 Joseph Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," Communio: International Catholic Review 
11, no. 4 (1984): 351, 55. 
11 Ibid., 354.  
12
 Ibid., 356. 
13 Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel," (Vatican Publishing House, 2009). 
14 "Deus Caritas Est," Encyclical, (2005); Joseph Ratzinger, "Liturgy and Sacred Music," 13, no. 4 
(1986): 386-87. 
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transcendental convertibility between goodness, truth and beauty means that 
beauty is able to reveal what is both good and true.
15
 
The second section of the thesis compares Ratzinger’s aesthetics with that of 
Hume and Kant respectively. Hume considers beauty to be simply a natural 
sentimental response, whereas Kant finds significance in beauty only in relation 
to the moral subject.
16
 Ratzinger, on the other hand, suggests that if our hearts are 
sincerely open to the reality of experiences, we will be able to recognize not only 
our desire for the infinitely beautiful, but also for the metaphysical reality of the 
good and the true.
17
 To touch one’s heart is to have an effect on his whole being 
including his sense of what is reasonable and what is morally just.
18
 Accordingly, 
Ratzinger explains that if one is to be open to the richness of transcendent beauty, 
he must prepare his heart to receive it, which includes practising moral discipline 
and contemplative exposure to the beautiful.
19
  
The final section of the dissertation concerns the problem of beauty in the context 
of Nietzschean nihilism as well as Adorno’s negative dialectics. Both strongly 
question the transcendental understanding of beauty, Nietzsche by overturning the 
Apollonian–Dionysian dichotomy in favour of the Dionysian, and Adorno by 
posing existential and moral arguments against the beautiful.
20
 Ratzinger is able 
to provide a response to these criticisms by going beyond the classical 
understanding of beauty and incorporating both philosophical and theological 
reflections that present beauty as the presentation of love and truth. 
                                                             
15 Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel."; Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The 
Glory of the Lord, a Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1982), 18. 
16 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, xii.  
17  Joseph Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 67-68. 
18 Cf. Benedict XVI, "Message of His Holiness Benedict XVI to Archbishop Gianfranco Ravasi, 
President of the Pontifical Council for Culture on the Occasion of the 13th Public Conference of 
the Pontifical Academies on the Theme: 'The Universality of Beauty: A Comparison between 
Aesthetics and Ethics'," (2008). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art Adorno's Aesthetic Theory Revisited, 99. 
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Method 
 
For the purpose of exploring Ratzinger’s aesthetics I have undertaken a literature 
review of Ratzinger’s published works available in English. Almost every speech 
and publication during his papacy have been translated into English, whereas 
many of his earlier works are yet to be translated from the German. It may be 
known to the reader that Ratzinger’s oeuvre was recently published in German, 
amounting to fourteen volumes in total, but so far only the volume on the liturgy 
has been translated into English.  
Those familiar with Ratzinger’s theological works will also recognize that there 
has been remarkable consistency in Ratzinger’s thoughts throughout his academic 
life, and the same can be said of his aesthetics. The Vatican website has published 
many formal addresses and homilies, of which there are hundreds mentioning 
beauty. Of particular note is an address given to The Communion and Liberation 
Movement three years before his election to the papacy, entitled, The Feeling of 
Things, the Contemplation of Beauty.
21
 In this speech, Ratzinger makes the point 
that beauty is more than a fleeting pleasure as judged by the senses. He points to 
Plato’s understanding of participation and eros, and brings in Augustine to 
consider beauty as revealed in the face of the suffering Christ.
22
  
This study relies on the fact that Ratzinger often discusses philosophical points in 
the context of a theological argument. Ratzinger gives philosophical insights 
relevant to his aesthetics in such notable titles as Introduction to Christianity, 
Dogma and Preaching, The Spirit of the Liturgy, Principles of Catholic Theology, 
Nature and Mission of Theology, Eschatology, and On the Way to Jesus Christ.
23
 
Secondary sources available in English have also contributed to my understanding 
                                                             
21 This address was given a new title when it appeared in a book compiling some of his work three 
years later: Joseph Ratzinger, "Wounded by the Arrow of Beauty: The Cross and the New 
‘Aesthetics’ of Faith," in On the Way to Jesus Christ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005). 
22 "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". 
23 Cf. Bibliography  
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of Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty, especially commentaries on his theology by 
Tracey Rowland, Aidan Nichols and Emery de Gaál.
24
  
The study compares Ratzinger’s aesthetics with that of Plato, Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas, as well as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Theodor Adorno. These philosophers have been chosen in respect to Ratzinger 
response to their thoughts as well as for their contribution to aesthetic philosophy. 
There are also contemporary philosophers and theologians mentioned in the study 
as they are often referred to by Ratzinger in the context of a discussion on 
aesthetics, for example, Josef Pieper, Romano Guardini, Luigi Giussani and Hans 
Urs von Balthasar. In fact, the entire thesis effectively takes the form of a 
literature review, and for this reason a separate chapter dedicated to such a review 
has been omitted. 
  
                                                             
24 Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed (London; New York: T & T Clark, 
2010); Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI; Aidan Nichols, "The Thought of 
Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger," Burns & Oates; 
Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). 
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PART I - Metaphysical Beauty 
  
 8 
 
1.1.1 The Integration of Philosophy and Theology 
 
The task of this study is to explore Ratzinger’s philosophical thoughts on beauty, 
but immediately there seems to be a problem: Ratzinger is not a philosopher but a 
theologian, and as such his philosophical deliberations are perhaps not to be taken 
alone but rather simply as in support of his theological arguments. In this regard 
one might consider his philosophical considerations to be superficial or hardly 
relevant. However, if we study Ratzinger’s works carefully we come across many 
important philosophical discussions on matters such as metaphysics, moral 
conscience and death, which all interrelate with his aesthetics. Furthermore, to 
characterize Ratzinger as a theologian simply dabbling in philosophy does little 
justice to the profundity of his philosophical insights. To be sure, Ratzinger does 
not claim to be an academic specialising in philosophy, but we shall see that this 
does not exhaust the meaning of a philosopher. 
As already mentioned, not only does philosophy contribute to Ratzinger’s own 
theology, but he himself contends that philosophy necessarily accompanies 
theology. Ratzinger says, “the integrity of faith depends on rigor of philosophical 
thinking, such that careful philosophizing is an irreplaceable part of genuine 
theological work!” Theology cannot express itself without the help of reason and 
the language of philosophy. Yet he also adds, “As a theologian, I do not regard 
philosophy as being, ultimately, a study which we pursue for philosophy’s 
sake”.25 This is because, for Ratzinger, philosophy does, in fact, belong “within 
the wider totality” of a theological discourse. 26  The reason for this is that 
philosophy asks questions that it cannot answer by itself, and so depends on 
theology for its own functioning.  
What is then to be said of philosophers rejecting theology and theologians 
claiming to practise theology without philosophy? Ratzinger attempts to 
demonstrate the errors of this severance, and endorses a thoroughly 
                                                             
25  Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 269. 
26 Ibid. 
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interdependent relationship between the two disciplines. He does this principally 
by the way he incorporates philosophy in his own theological works. Ratzinger 
also provides a historical reflection explaining that in the dawn of Christianity, the 
contemplation of the divine was not seen as a counterpoint to the object of reason, 
but rather, theology converged with Greek philosophy right from the beginning.
27
 
Here, Ratzinger points to Justin Martyr who summarizes the primary task of the 
philosopher as asking about God and living according to the Logos (λόγος).28 
Indeed, the Christian understanding of God as logos gave it a great impetus to 
incorporate elements of Greek philosophy. Ratzinger explains that “Logos means 
both reason and word - a reason which is creative and capable of self-
communication”.29 This word features as the primary designation of the Son of 
God in John’s Gospel, and Ratzinger interprets this as characterising the Christian 
God as a God of reason. Therefore, theology can never be separated from 
reason.
30
 Ratzinger also notes how Christianity appealed first and foremost to 
philosophy rather than to religious cult, such that the major dogmas of the 
Christian faith must be said to have emerged under Hellenistic influences.
31
 At the 
same time, it must be added that the relationship is mutually dependent, for reason 
derives from the God who is reasonable, or rather, God is the perfection of reason 
itself, as Ratzinger explains, 
                                                             
27 Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections," Lecture of the 
Holy Father. Apostolic Journey to Munchen, Altotting and Regensburg: Meeting with the 
representatives of science in the Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg (September 12), 
(2006), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html.  
28 "Saint Justin, Philosopher and Martyr," General Audience, (2007).  
29 "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §5.  Regensburg Address. 
30 Introduction to Christianity, 27. 
31 Ibid., 138; Cf. Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356. Ratzinger quotes Tertullian’s 
argument, “Christ called himself truth, not custom”, and so stresses that Christianity had opted 
“for the logos as against any kind of myth” (See Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 
141.Tertullian, quoted in Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 141). Interestingly, it is the same 
Tertullian who later famously denounces philosophy as an impediment to theology by positing 
“what has Athens to do with Jerusalem” (Tertullian in De praescriptione haereticorum, cited in 
Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 354.  
 10 
 
The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the 
intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the 
reasonableness of God, even though his understanding infinitely surpasses 
ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness
 32
  
We can see that the historical relationship between philosophy and theology was 
one of integration, especially as both were understood to be “striving for the same 
logos”.33  
Ratzinger observes that Augustine is a great example of the synthesis of 
philosophy and faith as demonstrated by the inclusion of Platonism and 
Neoplatonism in his theology.
34
 However, after Augustine there is a depreciation 
of this interrelationship. In fact, by the time of Thomas Aquinas, theology and 
philosophy are seen as separate fields altogether, with each distinguished by their 
respective domain of enquiry: supernatural revelation for the former, and natural 
reason for the latter.
35
 For John Duns Scotus, faith and reason need not correlate 
as God is completely free and not bound to reason or to goodness. Scotus 
dispenses with Thomas’ analogy of being and suggests that our sense of goodness 
                                                             
 
33  Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 139. Here, Ratzinger further explains that  
“The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the intelligibility of our 
existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the reasonableness of God, even though his 
understanding infinitely surpasses ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness” [Ibid.]. 
34 "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7. Ratzinger explains that it is 
not only scripture that influences Augustine toward the love of the faith, “But also philosophy, 
especially that of a Platonic stamp,” which “led him even closer to Christ, revealing to him the 
existence of the Logos or creative reason” ("Saint Augustine of Hippo (5)," General Audience, 5 
(2008).) 
35 Ratzinger contends that since this time, “philosophy has been assigned to the area of pure reason 
and theology to the area of revelation” (Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 353.). 
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and truth cannot in any way reflect the all-powerful God because his essence is 
utterly transcendent.
36
  
Continuing this into the sixteenth century Martin Luther makes the relationship 
between philosophy and theology absolutely void because metaphysics is rejected 
in the pursuit of a simpler faith.
37
 With the advent of Kant’s radical subjectivism, 
metaphysics loses its place as a legitimate means of philosophical enquiry 
altogether. Kant seeks to express pure reason uncontaminated by a priori 
assertions of faith, after which Martin Heidegger labels “Christian philosophy” a 
paradox, suggesting that philosophy’s purpose is to question rather than to explain 
an already accepted answer.
38
 Heidegger therefore calls for a new philosophy of 
“absolute questioning”, which he considers “the highest form of knowledge”.39  
 
1.1.2  Ratzinger’s Response 
 
Ratzinger argues contra Heidegger that posing questions and then attempting to 
remain uncommitted to a solution is a dishonest way to do philosophy. He 
suggests that rather than merely questioning, the true philosopher is one who is 
unafraid of finding an answer.
40
 In other words, the philosopher only achieves his 
goal by engaging with reality, and it is precisely the philosopher’s task to 
approach reality as it is, undeterred by apparent difficulties and limitations. 
Ratzinger then proposes that the philosopher must attempt to understand the 
mystery of death, the fate of all man. Yet since man is incapable of seeing beyond 
                                                             
36  Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7. Scotus 
proposes univocity of theological predication and so adheres to the radical metaphysical difference 
between God and man. 
37  Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356; Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the 
University Memories and Reflections". §9. 
38 Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 353. 
39
 Heidegger, Die Selbsthehauptung der Deustschen, 12 quoted in Josef Pieper, In Defense of 
Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1992), 115.  
40 Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 351, 55. 
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the horizon of death Ratzinger believes the Christian testimony of the resurrection 
must be considered a “spur” for deeper philosophical enquiry.41  
For the same reason, Ratzinger argues that the a priori of religious traditions 
should not be dismissed out of hand, but instead should be treated as welcome 
stimuli for philosophy. Ratzinger asks "How can philosophical thought be set in 
motion without some a priori concepts".
42
 Ratzinger further explains, 
…reason must listen to the great religious traditions if it does not wish to 
become deaf, dumb and blind precisely to what is essential about human 
existence. There is no great philosophy which does not draw life from 
listening to and accepting religious tradition. Wherever this relation is cut 
off, philosophical thought withers and becomes a mere conceptual game.
43
 
In other words, a philosophy that seeks the truth honestly and humbly would be 
willing to entertain an answer, even if it originates from divine revelation. As 
such, Ratzinger proposes that the Christian faith can lead to a deeper 
understanding concerning the reality of death, and so guide philosophy in the 
pursuit of truth. He says,  
  For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the 
great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and 
those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to 
ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and 
responding.
44
 
                                                             
41 Ibid., 354.  
42 Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 357; Here, Ratzinger may also be referring to 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, who asserts that “The object of philosophy is primarily of an a priori 
nature” (Dietrich von Hildebrand, What Is Philosophy? (Franciscan Herald Press, 1973), 63.)  
43  "Truth and Freedom," Communio 23, no. 1 (1996): 31; Cf. Josef Pieper, For the Love of 
Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 68-73.  
44 Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §15. Ultimately 
for Ratzinger, “Philosophy, the search for meaning in the face of death, presents itself as the 
search for Christ” (Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 351.).  
 13 
 
Ratzinger refers to Josef Pieper concerning this. According to Pieper, philosophy 
seeks to make sense of whatever we encounter, and so is naturally open to an 
answer deriving from theology.
45
 Pieper points to Sartre as a counter-example and 
accuses him of denying the existence of God “uncritically and without the shadow 
of any justification”. 46  Pieper contends that in such a case, the philosopher’s 
rejection of theology “takes on the character of a creed, whether or not one is 
aware of it and comfortable with it”.47  
At the same time, just as philosophy cannot answer itself when it poses questions 
concerning death and eternity, theology is inevitably grounded in philosophical 
methods and language. The attempt to dissociate theology from the limits of 
philosophy, exemplified by Martin Luther and Karl Barth, cannot succeed 
because philosophical thought necessarily pervades theology. If either discipline 
is to genuinely pursue the truth, it must recognize that the counterpart is 
indispensable for its own functioning. They are complementary and neither can 
claim to be an exclusive approach to truth.
48
  
Ratzinger explains that it is fitting that philosophy and theology work together in 
“a reciprocal and advantageous collaboration”. 49  It is no accident that Aidan 
Nichols posits that, ultimately, Ratzinger wishes to unite “philosophy and 
theology in a single, internally differentiated but also internally cohesive, 
intellectual act.”50 If philosophy and theology are not mutually exclusive sciences, 
                                                             
45 Pieper, In Defense of Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges, 115. 
46 Ibid., 111.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356. 
49 Benedict XVI, "Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)," General Audience, (2010). 
50 Aidan Nichols, The Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic Thought from Hermes 
to Benedict XVI (Hildenbrand Books, 2011), 288. Also see p. 193, where Nichols defines a central 
theme in Ratzinger's  works as "a convergence of the mainly philosophical disclosure of logos 
with the chiefly theological revelation of love"; Cf. Tracey Rowland, "The Role of Natural Law 
and Natural Right in the Search for a Universal Ethic," in Searching for a Universal Ethic: 
Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law Tradition, 
ed. J. Berkman and W.C. Mattison (Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 165. This should help 
clear up some doubts concerning a philosophical enquiry into the works of a theologian. 
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but rather, jointly conducted disciplines aiming at the one truth of reality, then a 
theologian must be reflecting on and referring to philosophical thoughts in his 
works. This is very much true in the case of Ratzinger, and this study aims to 
demonstrate in particular the way Ratzinger integrates philosophy and theology in 
his approach to the problem of beauty.  
 
1.2.1  Transcendental Participation 
 
According to Ratzinger, the experience of beauty occurs through the process of 
remembrance (anamnesis), which is a natural tendency in man towards 
transcendence, a “godlike constitution of our being” pointing away from 
oneself.
51
 He says, 
This anamnesis of the origin … is not a conceptually articulated knowing, 
a store of retrievable contents. It is so to speak an inner sense, a capacity 
to recall, so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not turned in on 
himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: ‘That’s it! That is what my 
nature points to and seeks.’52 
                                                             
51 Joseph Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," Communio 37, no. 3 (2010): 535. 
52 Ibid. In this article, Ratzinger replaces the medieval term “synderesis” with the above concept of 
“anamnesis” (p. 534).  He also explains that “anamnesis” is the exact word used by Paul in his 
letter to the Romans describing the conscience of the Gentiles, whereby they have held “a law to 
themselves—not in the sense of modern liberal notions of autonomy that preclude transcendence 
of the subject, but in the much deeper sense that nothing belongs less to me than I myself” 
(Romans 2:14ff). By highlighting the word “anamnesis”, Ratzinger illustrates that natural law is a 
kind of memory of the primordial forms; one that is outward focused, and which is able to draw 
out of oneself the desire for something greater, precisely as he recognizes that his being is rooted 
in something greater than himself. In being drawn by this desire for greatness, he simultaneously 
becomes aware that he is answerable to something natural and intrinsic to oneself. Here, Ratzinger 
is writing, not in psychological terms, but in ontological terms. The conscience belongs to our 
essence as human beings. In other words, we have an “inner ontological tendency” toward the 
good, which describes what is popularly referred to as our “moral compass” (p. 535). 
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At the same time, in our experience of beauty we are only given a glimpse of its 
perfection and we are left pondering what the fullness of infinite beauty might be. 
Ratzinger refers to Aristophanes from Plato’s Symposium, who explains that 
“lovers do not know what they really want of one another”, for the heart only has 
“a vague perception of what it truly wants and wonders about it as an enigma”.53  
Ratzinger further explains that the experience of beauty is an encounter that is 
primarily passive, “a shock” that comes from outside of us. He describes it further 
as being “touched, or rather wounded… the arrow of nostalgia pierces man, 
wounds him and in this way gives him wings, lifts him upwards towards the 
transcendent”.54  
This concept derives from Plato’s description of the beauty in the Phaedrus. 
According to Plato, beauty arouses a remembrance of the world of the Forms and 
gives the soul the power to ascend to it.
55
 Now, the Forms are perfect and 
incorruptible beings, whereas objects in visible space and time are simply 
becoming.
 56
 At the same time, one can say that the Form is in the visible object, 
and conversely the object possesses or shares in the Form.
57
 Accordingly, visible 
beauty for Plato can considered beautiful “because it partakes of (metechei) The 
Beautiful Thing”, and it is only “by The Beautiful thing that all beautiful things 
come to be beautiful”.58  
                                                             
53 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §7.  
54 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §6; Josef Pieper, Enthusiasm 
and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus, trans. Richard and Clara Winston. 
(South Bend: St Augustine's Press, 2000), Ch. 6.  
55 Phaedrus 247a-e, in Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus, Ch. 
6. 
56 Grabowski, Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms, 28: Grabowski cites Plato’s Cratylus, 440c; 
Phaedo, 65d-e; Republic, 485b; Philebus, 59a-c; Timaeus, 27d-28a, 29b-d. 
57 Ibid., 36: Grabowski cites Plato Gorgias, 506d,4, 467e7; Lysis, 217b6,c5; Euthydemus, 280b2, 
301a4; Cratylus 389b10, 389c1, 4. 
58 Phaedo, 100c5-6, as quoted in ibid., 34. Cf. Phaedo, 100d6-8: There is debate as to whether 
Plato considers ousia a higher form of existent particulars or simply the universal of the sensible 
counterparts (ibid., 32-33.). 
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We must also mention Plotinus, for whom the semblance of the creative One is 
marked in creation in such a way that the visible world becomes a sign of and 
pathway to the invisible One.
59
 Plotinus is particularly important here because of 
his influence on Augustine, who replaces the One with the Christian God, such 
that sensible beauty originates from God himself.
 60
 Augustine brings together his 
knowledge of philosophy and the Scriptures to assert that the beauty of creation 
“proclaims that its maker could have been none other than God, the ineffably and 
invisibly beautiful”.61 In other words, the beauty of the invisible creator can be 
seen through the visible created world.
62
 This is the basic metaphysical 
understanding of participation which grounds Ratzinger’s aesthetics.  
According to Ratzinger, whatever is truly beautiful owes its beauty to the God 
who is supreme beauty. In an eschatological sense, the beauty of the world we see 
is passing and the perfect and infinite beauty of God awaits us, but at the same 
time, Ratzinger suggests that the theory of participation is not about escaping the 
material world in a dualistic sense.
63
 In the same way, we must note that although 
Plato’s development of the idea of beauty culminates in man’s capacity to 
transcend the world of appearances, the means of achieving this is precisely via 
                                                             
59  Plotinus, Enneads V, 8, 9. as referred to in Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the 
Thought of Saint Augustine (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1992), 
37. 
60 Ibid., 42: Here, Harrison makes reference to Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, 43, 45. 
61 Augustine, De Civitate Dei 11.4 quoted in Aidan Nichols, "Redeeming Beauty Soundings in 
Sacral Aesthetics," Ashgate. Nichols, Redeeming Beauty, 9. Here, Nichols also refers to Carol 
Harrison’s citation of Augustine’s Sermones 241, 2; Confessiones X, 6., and Enarrationes in 
Psalmos 61, 17.  
62 Augustine, Retractationes, I. 6. in ibid., 6: “Through the intermediary of corporeal things I 
myself wanted to attain or lead others to attain, incorporeal things”. For this reason, Augustine 
warns that we are not to look at the beauty of creation lest we lose forget the true source of beauty. 
God’s beauty is reflected in the world as we know it because creation reveals the Creator 
(Augustine, Confessions, X); Cf. Pontifical Council for Culture, "Concluding Document of the 
Plenary Assembly: The Via Pulchritudinis, Privileged Pathway for Evangelization and Dialogue," 
(2006). 
63 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §19-21. 
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the sensory world.
64
 As Ratzinger explains, the experience of beauty is not about 
leaving the world behind, but rather implies being “anchored in the world yet 
open to God” and thereby transcending the division “between the beauty of things 
and God as beauty”.65  
Therefore, Ratzinger suggests that an important function of art is to facilitate an 
encounter with the transcendent God. He says, 
A work of art is a product of the creative capacity of the human being who 
in questioning visible reality, seeks to discover its deep meaning and to 
communicate it through the language of forms, colour and sound. Art is 
able to manifest and make visible the human need to surpass the visible, it 
expresses the thirst and the quest for the infinite.
66
 
Ratzinger points to the works of Antoni Gaudi as instances of beautiful art that 
stimulates anamnesis through the visible forms of “stones, lines, planes, and 
points”.67 Ratzinger also reflects how in a Gothic church, “we are enraptured by 
the vertical lines that soar skywards and uplift our gaze and our spirit, while at the 
same time we feel small yet long for fullness....”68  
Ultimately, he says to artists, 
Authentic beauty… unlocks the yearning of the human heart, the profound 
desire to know, to love, to go towards the Other, to reach for the Beyond. 
                                                             
64 Pieper, Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus, Ch. 6. Pieper 
maintains that the erotic emotion, this same overpowering emotion which gives wings to the soul 
and leads it back home to the abode of the gods, has the character of passion, of ravishment by 
something in the visible world, and that therefore—like all other "passions"—it springs from the 
body and the senses. 
65 Benedict XVI, "Apostolic Journey to Santiago De Compostela and Barcelona - Eucharistic 
Celebration on the Occasion of the Dedication of the Church of the Sagrada Familia and the Altar 
in Barcelona," Homily, (2010).  
66
 Benedict XVI, "Art and Prayer". 
67 "Apostolic Journey to Santiago De Compostela and Barcelona - Eucharistic Celebration on the 
Occasion of the Dedication of the Church of the Sagrada Familia and the Altar in Barcelona".  
68 "Art and Prayer". 
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If we acknowledge that beauty touches us intimately, that it wounds us, 
that it opens our eyes, then we rediscover the joy of seeing, of being able 
to grasp the profound meaning of our existence, the Mystery of which we 
are part.
69
 
Ratzinger explains refers this process by which we encounter God in the 
experience of beauty as the via pulchritudinis, “the way of beauty”.70 The deep 
thirst and quest for the infinite can only be quenched by the delight in the union 
with God himself, who is “Beauty ever ancient, ever new”.71 
 
1.2.2 Transcendental Convertibility 
 
Along with the theory of participation, Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty refer to the 
metaphysical principle of transcendental convertibility. This is the concept that 
presents beauty’s interchangeable relationship with goodness and truth. It has 
origins in Ancient Greek metaphysics, and is seen in Plato’s writings on truth, 
goodness and beauty as eminent or divine Forms, as well as in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, where he sets the transcendentals apart from his ten categories of 
existence.
72
 Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, explains that being, truth and 
goodness are the same reality, although differing in concept; being denotes the 
object’s very existence and essence, truth expresses its knowability, and goodness 
its desirability.
73
 As for beauty, there is some doubt as to whether Thomas 
                                                             
69 "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel." 
70 Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel." 
71 "Message of the Holy Father for the 49th World Day of Prayer for Vocations,"  (2011). Cf. 
Augustine, Confessions, X27.28, as well as, Emma Jane Marie Spargo, The Category of the 
Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 
1953), Ch.1. 
72 Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas: In a Historical Perspective, 57-58. 
Plato mostly considers the concept of transcendentals as exemplified in the relationship of the 
Good with the True and the One; See, for example, Plato on truth in Phaedrus 247b-247e; on 
goodness cf. Phaedo 72c-82e; on beauty cf. Symposium, 211c-212e; Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics III. 
73 Josef Pieper, Living the Truth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 29-34  
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considers it a transcendental along with goodness and truth.
74
 John Dadosky and 
Leo Elders both suggest that the reason behind Thomas’ omission of beauty from 
his list of transcendentals might be due to his conviction that beauty is in some 
way different from the other transcendentals.
75
 This conclusion seems to be in 
agreement with Ratzinger’s aesthetics, especially as it relates to Balthasar’s 
understanding of beauty. Ratzinger alludes to this in his papal address to artists, 
where he cites Balthasar description of beauty as forming “a halo, an untouchable 
                                                             
74  John D. Dadosky, The Eclipse and Recovery of Beauty: A Lonergan Approach (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014), 33-36. Dadosky reviews various authors’ explanation for 
Thomas’ omission of beauty in his list of transcendentals. Kovach, in his Philosophy of Beauty 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974) suggests that the systematic treatment of the 
transcendentals occurs very early in Thomas’ writings in the De Veritate, and this early reference 
does not suffice to convince one of his judgment on beauty as a transcendental later in life. 
Kovach goes on to points out that, in fact, Thomas expresses that every being is good and 
beautiful, just as for Plato, and so Thomas must consider beauty a transcendental along with 
goodness and truth. Furthermore, he explains that the beautiful and the good are equal in such a 
way that everything good is beautiful and everything beautiful is good. That is, they are identical 
and hence convertible, but merely conceptually different, which is congruent with his thoughts on 
the transcendental. Others express similar views to Kovach on Aquinas’ consideration of beauty as 
a transcendental, for example Armand Maurer says, “Beauty is a transcendental mode of being, 
accompanying being wherever it is found, so that every being is beautiful insofar as it exists” 
(Armand Maurer, About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation, Houston, Texas: Center for 
Thomistics Studies, University of St. Thomas, 1983, 34). Jan Aertsen objects that the omission of 
beauty from the list of transcendentals in De Veritate is conclusive enough and that Thomas 
definitely did not consider beauty a transcendental (Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the 
Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Leiden: E.K. Brill, 1996, 335-59.). Jacques 
Maritain explains that Thomas subordinates beauty under the transcendental of goodness, but that 
nevertheless beauty is a transcendental (Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers 
of Poetry, Trans. J. W. Evans, New York: Scribner & Sons, 172). Umberto Eco agrees, writing 
that for Thomas, “beauty adheres to being only through the mediation of the good” and specifies 
that for Thomas, “beauty adheres to being only through the mediation of the good” (Umberto Eco, 
Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 37).  
75 Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas: In a Historical Perspective, 142; 
Dadosky, The Eclipse and Recovery of Beauty: A Lonergan Approach, 36: “While I agree with 
Kovach that Aquinas arrived at beauty later in his career, I also think that if beauty is a 
transcendental, it may well be a different type of transcendental, in the way Bonaventure perhaps 
was suggesting when he speaks of beauty as the splendour of the transcendentals together.” 
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crown around the double constellation of the true and the good and their 
inseparable relation to one another”.76 
According to Balthasar, “unity, truth, goodness and beauty do not belong as 
properties possessed at one’s own disposal”, but rather point “to the primordial 
ground of being which replicates itself in it in an image”. 77  This primordial 
ground of being is God himself, which means in each individual being the 
transcendentals disclose the imprint of the divine being.
78
 This disclosure occurs 
through the being’s form, which is both its beauty and its essence:  
Being inevitably includes being of a certain kind (species) or, what comes 
to the same thing, a form (forma), two words which imply both “essence” 
and “Beauty” and are immediately understood by Augustine in this duality 
(speciosus and formosus), “beautiful”, “well-formed”.79  
This dual characteristic of the form is also recognised by Thomas Aquinas, who 
says in his Summa Theologiae: 
Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are 
based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness 
is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly 
                                                             
76  "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel."; Cf. Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, a 
Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form, 18. 
77 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Theological Aesthetics. Vol. 4 (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1989), 374. Balthasar quotes from De Veritate q 22, a 2, ad 2: “Being itself is a likeness 
of the divine goodness”; Cf. Angelo Campodonico, "Hans Urs Von Balthasar’s Interpretation of 
the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," Nova et Vetera 8 (2010): 43. 
78  Stephen Fields, "The Beauty of the Ugly: Balthasar, the Crucifixion, Analogy and God," 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 2 (2007): 174; Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Volume 2: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical 
Styles (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 333f.  
79 The Glory of the Lord : A Theological Aesthetics. Volume 2 : Studies in Theological Style: 
Clerical Styles, 115; Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine, 38: 
Augustine explains that visible beauty participates in the beauty of its creator in these two ways – 
in its appearance or external form, as well as in its essence as created being, which corresponds 
with the Greek word, Idea.  
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relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and 
therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of 
movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the 
cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. 
Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things 
duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind - because even sense 
is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty.
80
 
In summary, the desirability of the form refers to the good, and the relationship of 
the form to the mind signifies its beauty. Furthermore, truth is concerned with the 
knowability of essences, and the beauty of the form in due proportion acts as a 
means to its knowability. This suggests that it is precisely through the object’s 
beauty that being is revealed as good and true. Elders points to this idea when he 
says, “To the extent that the beautiful is ordered to the cognitive faculties it is 
related to the true, while to the extent that it satisfies the appetitive faculty, it is 
related to the good”.81 In other words, beauty is a transcendental precisely in its 
capacity to present both the good and the true.  
According to D. C. Schindler, Balthasar develops on this notion by describing the 
event of desiring the good and being drawn by the truth in terms of the 
“subjective-objectivity” of the beautiful.82 The subject, through his senses, grasps 
the form, but then is “enraptured” by the splendour of eternal being which draws 
the subject into a deeper encounter.
83
 This “Splendour reveals itself 
fundamentally as a sign for the appearing of a depth and a fullness that transcends 
                                                             
80 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, 5, 4  ad 1, in Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. 
Thomas Aquinas: In a Historical Perspective, 142: Thomas continues, “Now since knowledge is 
by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal 
cause”  
81
 Ibid. For Elders, this is what makes beauty unique as a transcendental in Thomas’ thoughts. 
82  Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A Philosophical 
Investigation, 409: “Beauty is the whole that allows each to be dependent on each other”. 
83 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, a Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form, 119.  
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our reach”.84 Therefore, in the subject’s contemplation of the form, the form itself 
reciprocates by the irruption of splendour from within.
85
  
There is an interaction, then, between the subject and object, such that it is not 
only the observer who approaches the beautiful, but it also happens that the 
beautiful approaches the observer. In order to see the objective truth, one must be 
“drawn out of himself toward the object”, and this is only possible if one is 
affected by the good, that is “the simultaneity of desire and self-gift”. 86  The 
encounter with beauty enables this meeting between the subjective desire for the 
good and the objective vision of truth.
87
  
This is very important for Ratzinger, who points out that Plato’s notion of 
philosophy as the pursuit of eternal Being with the strength of eros is in fact 
compatible with the Christian life. The philosopher’s task is to seek the truth 
understood as “Being itself, or even more - the Good and the Beautiful that are 
beyond Being”.88 The search for goodness and beauty is in fact both a moral 
activity and a search for God, for “The beauty of the works of which the Gospel 
speaks, refers beyond them to another beauty, truth and goodness whose 
                                                             
84 Ibid., 117f. 
85 Ibid., 151: “The beautiful is above all a form, and the light does not fall on this from above and 
from outside, rather it breaks forth from the form’s interior.” 
86  Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A Philosophical 
Investigation, 409. 
87 Ibid.  
88  Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental 
Theology (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 360. Here, Ratzinger offers the “beyond being” as 
an “even more”, which could imply that Ratzinger considers the notion of “beyond being” 
contained in eternal Being itself. That is, Being itself is infinitely above beings, and so it cannot be 
considered simply the greatest among beings. Since, according to the terms of analogy, our 
understanding of being and substance is appropriately applicable to God without diminishing his 
transcendence, then eternal Being implies beyond-being at the same time. Either way, when 
Ratzinger says that God is beautiful or that he is Beauty, he is not attempting to define and hence 
restrict God under own concepts as Heidegger might allege, nor is he speaking in equivocal terms. 
What he means is that God is indeed beautiful, but in an analogous sense, beyond our imagination, 
and every experience of beauty points to this reality. 
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perfection and ultimate source is in God alone”.89 Ratzinger founds this idea on 
the Greek term kalà erga, which is used in Scripture to mean both good and 
beautiful at the same time. The moral activity of man is made beautiful when it is 
acted in accordance with truth, for “the beauty of works manifests and expresses, 
in an excellent synthesis, the goodness and profound truth of the action, as well as 
the coherence and holiness of those who perform it”.90  
The convertibility of the transcendentals, then, is highly relevant for positing the 
interrelation between the aesthetic and moral realms of human life. This is 
important for Ratzinger who believes the separation between aesthetics and ethics 
presents a major crisis in our time. He says, 
The need and urgency for a renewed dialogue between aesthetics and 
ethics, between beauty, truth and goodness, is once again proposed to us 
not only by the current cultural and artistic debate but also by daily reality. 
In fact, the split emerges dramatically at different levels and at times there 
is a glaring contrast between the two dimensions: the search for beauty, 
understood reductively as an external form, as appearance, to be sought at 
all costs, and that of the truth and goodness of actions carried out to 
achieve a specific goal.
91
 
Ratzinger believes that the problem of aestheticism and a degrading moral life are 
associated with the separation of beauty from truth and goodness. Moral relativity 
                                                             
89  Benedict XVI, "Message of His Holiness Benedict XVI to Archbishop Gianfranco Ravasi, 
President of the Pontifical Council for Culture on the Occasion of the 13th Public Conference of 
the Pontifical Academies on the Theme: 'The Universality of Beauty: A Comparison between 
Aesthetics and Ethics'." 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. Ratzinger continues, “Indeed, a quest for beauty that was foreign or divorced from the 
human quest for truth and goodness would be transformed, as unfortunately happens, into mere 
aestheticism and above all, for the youngest, into an itinerary that focuses on what is transient, 
banal and superficial in appearance or even to an escape towards artificial paradises that mask and 
hide inner emptiness and inconsistency. Such an illusive and superficial search certainly would not 
have a universal breadth but would inevitably prove to be totally subjective if not actually 
individualistic and would sometimes even end in incommunicability”  
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depends on the perceived separation of moral goodness from truth. However, 
even when the relationship between conscience and truth is respected, truth itself 
becomes liable to err when beauty is neglected. Ratzinger describes this situation 
by recalling the medieval idiom, “reason has a wax nose”, which is to say that, “it 
can be pointed in any direction, if one is clever enough”.92  
Ratzinger believes that we can be aided in our pursuit of the truth and the good by 
being wounded by the arrow of beauty. Beauty reminds us of the truth and 
goodness of being and of God, and so gives us the desire to respond with all our 
heart. If by their convertibility in being, beauty is true and truth beauty, then the 
encounter with beauty must be a rational experience. Ultimately, Ratzinger 
explains that, “The beautiful is knowledge certainly, but, in a superior form, since 
it arouses man to the real greatness of the truth”. 93  This is connected with 
Ratzinger’s understanding that “being itself is true, in other words apprehensible, 
because God, pure intellect, made it, and he made it by thinking it”.94 In other 
words, the knowledge imparted by the encounter with beauty is the knowledge of 
being, and of God, the logos, the foundation of all reason, which goes beyond the 
knowledge of facts and of human history.
95
  
Thus far we have considered Ratzinger’s understanding of beauty as derived by 
the metaphysical presentation of both philosophy and Christian theology. 
Ratzinger holds that beauty is a transcendental, and this means our experience of 
it can draw us on beyond the material world and become an encounter with being 
itself, which is to say, an encounter with God, who is logos. As such beauty can 
give us knowledge of God, and direct us towards truth and goodness. In the next 
                                                             
92 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §12. 
93 Ibid., §8. 
94 Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 59. Ratzinger argues against the relativistic notion 
of truth conceived simply as contextually appropriate man-made concepts. Truth, according to 
Ratzinger is prior to and beyond man who cannot even fathom his own existence without it, for 
indeed, “Man did not create the cosmos” (p. 61), rather, it is “logos of the creative spirit” that 
“governs his being” (p. 59).  
95 Ibid., 59-63. 
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chapters, we will discuss whether this knowledge derived from beauty is indeed 
rational, and how this knowledge might be different from that of facts and history. 
 
1.2.3 Analogy of Being 
 
To help appreciate Ratzinger’s integration of philosophy and theology as reflected 
in his thoughts on beauty, we must understand the concept of analogy by which 
theological truths are expressed in metaphysical terms. Ratzinger says, 
All human knowing is accomplished with reference to and within this 
world. Consequently, if human knowing is to make a statement about 
something that is not “world”, it can do so only with the materials of this 
world; it cannot grasp that something in its proper being, as it is in itself, 
but only by means of approximations and similarities that exist within 
worldly being, therefore “analogously” in comparisons and images.96 
This operation of language to express the relationship between being and God 
refers the notion of analogia entis (analogy of being).
97
 According to the 
Thomistic tradition, it is the linguistic corollary of the metaphysical principle of 
participation, whereby human words describing God are thought to participate in 
the fullness of the original principle predicated of God.
98
 Ratzinger notes how in 
any description of God the “unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, 
yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language”.99 In other words, 
                                                             
96 Joseph Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life (Ignatius 
Press, 2011), 262. 
97  Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift, 14: In Ratzinger’s 
inaugural lecture of 1959, he explains that the analogy of being is “a necessary dimension of 
Christian reality” because Christ is Logos. This means that Ratzinger considers metaphysics 
indispensable for theology. 
98
 Leo Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas: In a Historical Perspective, trans. 
John Dudley (E.J. Brill, 1993), 47. 
99 Ratzinger is referring to the Fourth Lateran Council which stipulates that it is possible to speak 
of God so long as we recognize that his unlikeness (to man and creation) is greater than any 
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analogy of being works because there is a genuine relationship between the 
reason and language of the spirit and the reason and language of nature.
100 
Analogia entis has a particular relevance for Martin Heidegger who opposes the 
attempt to equate God with being. Heidegger calls it “onto-theology” and 
considers it intrinsically flawed because it is a metaphysics that “determines how 
the deity enters into it” and does not give room for the Dasein to conceal and 
disclose itself in its own terms.
101
 More specifically, Heidegger’s concern is not 
that onto-theology arrogantly endeavours to make sense of God, but that it does 
not even attempt to understand being.
102
 For Heidegger, Christian philosophy 
abuses ontology because it only borrows it as a way of falsely grounding a 
preconceived theology.  
Here, again, we must turn to Balthasar, a theologian commended by Ratzinger for 
his work on aesthetics among other things. Balthasar responds to Heidegger by 
suggesting that the metaphysics of being is not to be seen as a restriction of God, 
but conversely, as a means of conveying precisely God’s transcendence.103 For 
                                                                                                                                                                      
likeness ("Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7.) Ratzinger also 
provides a longer summary of analogy with reference to Thomas Aquinas: “The correctness of 
theological reasoning and its real cognitive meaning is based on the value of theological language 
which, in St Thomas' opinion, is principally an analogical language. The distance between God, 
the Creator, and the being of his creatures is infinite; dissimilitude is ever greater than similitude 
(cf. DS 806). Nevertheless in the whole difference between Creator and creatures an analogy 
exists between the created being and the being of the Creator, which enables us to speak about 
God with human words.” ("Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)").  
100 "Christian Universalism: On Two Collections of Papers by Hans Urs Von Balthasar," in Joseph 
Ratzinger in Communio. Volume 1, Unity of the Church, ed. David L Schindler (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eerdmans, 2010), 133.  
101 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1969), 56. Cf. David C. Schindler, "‘Wie Kommt Der Mensch in Die Theologie?’: 
Heidegger, Hegel, and the Stakes of onto-Theo-Logy," Communio 32, no. 4 (2005): 643.  
102  David C Schindler, "Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of onto-
Theology," Analecta Hermeneutica 1, no. 1 (2009): 111.  
103  David C. Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A 
Philosophical Investigation (Fordham University Press, 2004), 365ff.: Balthasar describes being 
as that which both discloses and conceals itself in the world of beings. Schindler says, “It is 
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Balthasar, God is not actually being, but rather, beyond being.
104
 When we say 
that God is being, it must be taken analogously for the true meaning of being is 
beyond us. Ratzinger takes this up in his own consideration of God and being, 
which has implications on his understanding of beauty. We shall see that, for 
Ratzinger, the philosopher’s God of pure Being is transcended by the God of faith. 
Ultimately, Ratzinger integrates his theological understanding with philosophy for 
a unique perspective on beauty as person, where the divine and transcendent 
beauty is not only the delight of eros, but also simultaneously agape, a love that 
goes to the end.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Balthasar who, in his Glory of the Lord, challenges Heidegger’s critique by suggesting that 
metaphysics thinks God in terms of being rather than restricting him to being. The principle of 
analogia entis establishes a relationship with the being of the world and the being of God, but it 
does not abrogate God’s transcendence in any way. In fact, precisely by its commitment to 
analogy, analogia entis affirms God’s infinite difference. In this way, the validity of metaphysics 
is upheld.”; Cf. Schindler, "Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of onto-
Theology," 110.  
104 "Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of onto-Theology," 111. 
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PART II - Reason and Experience 
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2.  Introduction 
 
In Part One, we explored the theory of participation and the convertibility of the 
transcendentals, which together form an important part of Ratzinger’s 
metaphysical aesthetics. As discussed, Ratzinger is very much influenced by 
classical and medieval philosophers, most notably Plato, Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas.
105
 In line with these thinkers, Ratzinger considers metaphysics 
indispensable for philosophy. Of course, man is unable to ascertain truth in its 
entirety, and yet, like Plato, “he can love it and search for it” and that is what he 
considers the activity of a true philosopher.
106
 He says, “philosophy is a great 
reaching out for eternal Being, a learning to contemplate truth, a rational effort of 
the Spirit to find true meaning”.107  
However, there are various theories of aesthetics allegedly detached from 
metaphysical principles. For instance, David Home focuses on the experience of 
man at the expense of reason, and so presents an aesthetics based on sentiment, 
while Kant places the mind at the centre of experience and so offers a purely 
subjective aesthetics. Metaphysical beauty is also rejected by the positivists 
because it is not in accordance with scientifically verifiable knowledge. 
Ratzinger’s metaphysical aesthetics is therefore in conflict with a number of 
modern aesthetic theories. The remainder of the study will explore how these 
theories relate to Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty. 
 
 
                                                             
105  It is important to note that Ratzinger does not reject Thomas’ principles of metaphysics, 
especially that on the analogy of being. The simple conjecture that Ratzinger is more Augustinian 
than a follower of Thomas merely represents the fact that Ratzinger prefers a holistic approach 
comprising of imageries than the dry conceptual formulations of scholasticism. Cf. Rowland, 
Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, 4-5. 
106  Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 360. Cf. Ulrich Wilckens, “Sophia”, in 
Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 7:407-408. 
107 Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 360. 
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2.1  David Hume  
 
Let us start by considering David Hume, who gives an empiricist account of 
causality, faith and standards of taste based on the principle of induction. That is, 
“that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple 
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly 
represent”. 108  For instance, Hume suggests that our adherence to theories of 
causality come about from repeated experience of conjunctive events, however, 
they are in fact nothing but an assumption connecting past experiences and 
projecting them to future ones. According to Hume, then, theories of causality 
cannot be considered valid if we are to follow the rules of logic.
109
  
Hume applies similar empirical principles to explain the notion of beauty, which 
is a concept arising from man’s experience of a particular pleasure. Now, he 
distinguishes two sources of pleasure and hence two types of beauty, the first 
being simply taking pleasure in the external form of an object. This pleasure is a 
sentiment that arises “by the primary constitution of our nature”, that is, as part of 
a physiological response to perceiving an object with a particular order to its 
constituent parts.
110
 The second and more common experience of beauty derives 
from the imagination’s delight in the object’s apparent utility.111 In sum, Hume 
reduces beauty to a sensation owing to man’s physiological nature and his 
capacity for imagination.  
In order to validate his thoughts on beauty Hume adds an explanation for the 
validity of intersubjective judgements.
112
 He comments that there are “general 
                                                             
108 Hume, Treatise, I.i.I, 9, quoted in Paul Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste Kant's Response 
to Hume (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 201.  
109  Hume, Treatise, I.iii.6, 62, quoted in Paul Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s 
Response to Hume, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 202. 
110 Hume, Treatise, II.ii.5, 235, quoted in Paul Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s 
Response to Hume, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 204. 
111 Hume, Treatise, II.ii.5, 235, quoted in Paul Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s 
Response to Hume, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 204. 
112 Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste Kant's Response to Hume, 205-06. 
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rules of art” which are “founded only on experience and the observation of the 
common sentiments of human nature”, and yet the aptitude to recognise these 
general principles vary in degree from subject to subject.
113
 He then proposes a 
number of conditions that might make one an ideal critic, including a sound mind, 
thorough exposure to art, delicate senses, and the lack of ill prejudice.
114
 Hume 
believes these criteria limit the correct perception of the beautiful to the 
competent critic and so avoids the relativist position that “a thousand different 
sentiments excited by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment 
represents what is really in the object”.115  
However, it is difficult to reconcile the rejection of relativity with Hume’s own 
basic contention that “beauty is no quality in things themselves”.116 Although 
Hume postulates the existence of rules or principles by which an art critic is to be 
selected and so supposes that someone at least can judge an artwork as beautiful 
or not, the rules themselves are empirically derived. In other words, Hume’s 
strictly empiricist approach to philosophy leaves no room for a metaphysical 
consideration of beauty.  
 
2.1.1  Ratzinger on the Value of Experience 
 
Ratzinger takes the experience of man seriously as removed from any theories of 
science and so is in agreement with Hume in many ways. Ratzinger knows that 
speculative thought can be too rigid and ultimately meaningless, as exemplified in 
the “dryness of a type of scholasticism” that have become “stale and brittle”.117 
That is why, when speaking on freedom’s accountability to the truth, Ratzinger 
                                                             
113 Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste”, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. E. Miller, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty, 1985), 230 in Zangwill, "Aesthetic Realism 1," 78. 
114 Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste Kant's Response to Hume, 205-06. 
115 Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste”, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. E. Miller, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty, 1985), 230 in Zangwill, "Aesthetic Realism 1," 78. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, "Foreword," in The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich Von Hildebrand : A 
Biography, ed. Alice Von Hildebrand (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 12.  
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says, “let us refrain from setting to work with abstract philosophical 
considerations. Rather, let us try to approach an answer inductively starting from 
the realities of history as they are actually given”.118 He goes as far as to say that 
“all human knowledge must have a sensory structure; it must have its beginning 
in experience, in the perception of the senses”.119  
For Ratzinger, a proper understanding of beauty arises from one’s sense 
experience of it. He thus points to his very own experience of beauty and 
considers it valid evidence for characterising it as a potent and intimate encounter 
that leads to the contemplation of God. One particular experience which stands 
out for Ratzinger is that of a Bach concert conducted by Leonard Bernstein in 
1981. Ratzinger recalls: 
When the last note of one of the great Thomas-Kantor-Cantatas 
triumphantly faded away, we looked at each other spontaneously and right 
then we said: ‘Anyone who has heard this, knows that the faith is true’. 120  
In this experience of beauty, Ratzinger claims to an acute awareness of the truth 
without mediation, or rather, the reality of the faith manifest in the beauty 
mediated by sound and the senses. Now, if the aim of philosophical abstraction is 
to understand reality and provide a reasoned expression to describe it, then it can 
only be considered secondary and analogous to that actual reality, or an instance 
                                                             
118 Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom," 23. Philosophical abstractions are relevant only insofar as it 
responds to questions of concrete importance, as Ratzinger says again of freedom, “It is not 
merely abstract philosophical considerations, but the quite concrete situation of our society, which 
compels us to ask such questions” (p. 20). 
119  This dependence on sense knowledge is not empiricism, but rather an understanding of 
knowledge founded on Thomas Aquinas’ definition of the soul as the form of the body. Ratzinger 
agrees with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas’ notion that everything we know comes from sense 
experience: “There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses” (Principles of 
Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 343-44).  
120 "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §13. Ratzinger was at this concert with 
the Lutheran Bishop Hanselmann who was also struck by the beauty of the music. The concert 
was dedicated to Karl Richter, who had recently died. 
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of it. This is why theories of metaphysics can only develop in an attitude of 
openness to the concrete experience of reality.  
At the same time, to reflect on one’s personal experience alone and to ignore the 
experience of others is to restrict the scope of one’s understanding. Therefore, 
Ratzinger refers to the value of collective human experience in the writings of 
past and contemporary thinkers. We are responsible for evaluating the thoughts 
and traditions that are part of our culture, but this is not a simple task given that 
even our evaluation is conditioned by the same culture we live in. We cannot 
shake it off and begin only with experiences. Each person is born into a society 
with a specific culture established by others before him, and so it is clear that 
human knowledge does not start from scratch, or tabula rasa.
121
 This means that 
the evaluation of experience by pre-conditioned patterns of thought must be 
verified by further contemplation of the experience. In other words, thought and 
experience work together to achieve an understanding of reality. That is why 
Ratzinger comes to the knowledge of the transcendentals from his own encounter 
with reality and by engaging with the various traditions of philosophy and 
theology.
122
 
 
2.1.2  Abstract Thinking 
 
Since the intention to remove abstract thinking derives from abstraction, one can 
only pretend that empiricism does away with abstract thought. Nevertheless, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s positivism attempts to devalue abstract thinking by 
reducing philosophical thought to the analysis of ordinary language. As 
philosophy becomes more and more detached from the pursuit of metaphysical 
                                                             
121 Cf. Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 247-49. 
122  On the importance of testimony, Ratzinger says, “Relying on those who see, we advance 
gradually toward him, and the buried memory of God, which is written on the heart of every man, 
awakens more and more to life in the depths of our own being”, and then he explains the 
importance of own testimony, our own lived experiences: “When we live close to God, our sight is 
restored: when we use our eyes, they bear witness to his truth” (Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and 
the Crisis of Cultures (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 115-16.).  
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truth, any proposition that is not inherently comprehensible within the ordinary 
meaning of the terms used is deemed too abstract and irrelevant to a positivistic 
philosophy. That is, without metaphysics, an argument might be judged by its 
grammatical logic rather than its appeal to truth. Moreover, truth itself becomes 
simply another term that can be discarded.  
Ratzinger, therefore, argues against positivism saying that, “by its exactness, 
exact knowledge bars the way to wisdom, which asks about the most profound 
depth of our existence”.123 The positivist’s exact knowledge depends more on 
established theories from repeated sensory observation as opposed to any kind of 
immediate sensory experience because the latter is considered prone to error. So 
while on one hand positivism presents a materialist view of the world, on the 
other hand, it undermines the significance of the very sensory experience which it 
alleges to derive knowledge from. The push for scientific thinking has established 
a dichotomy then between thought and experience, such that every experience, 
from the sensory to the spiritual, is deemed untrustworthy.  
Ratzinger points out that with the support of the scientific successes in today’s 
technological era, positivism has taken a strong hold in popular thought. All 
propositions that are strictly scientific theories are considered completely relative, 
as Ratzinger explains, “natural science has nourished a skepticism with regard to 
everything which cannot be explained or proved by its exact methods: all such 
things seem in the end to be a mere subjective assignment of value which cannot 
pretend to be universally binding”. 124  This becomes a pertinent factor in 
diminishing the metaphysical and theological role of beauty. 
Ratzinger proposes that beauty, like the truth, is a metaphysical reality. To be 
precise, it is a transcendental coextensive with being, which means beauty 
precedes our experience of it. This can be stated with respect to both inductive 
and deductive methods of reasoning. If one becomes aware of this, he may be 
                                                             
123
 Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 360. Here, 
“exact knowledge” does not refer to material or sensory information as such, but to scientifically 
verifiable facts. 
124 (sic.) "Truth and Freedom," 16. 
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able to open his sense of reason and encounter beauty’s full transcendental 
grandeur. However, this is only possible if we understand the capacity for 
experience to be a rational encounter in and of itself, rather than being limited to 
being a scientific endeavour to establish facts. 
To accept this, we must recognize that reason and experience are not at odds with 
each other, but nor are they reducible to the one or the other. In fact, they nourish 
each other so that one can perceive reality as it is. This is how the philosopher 
uses reason well, that is, by precisely contemplating the “totality of things we 
encounter”. 125  Luigi Giussani, a philosopher highly respected by Ratzinger, 
explains that “Experience itself, in its totality, leads to the authentic 
comprehension of the term reason or rationality”. 126 Therefore, experience of 
reality is necessary to reasoning. Reason is something that “illuminates the factors 
within” reality, and is characterised by “unexhausted openness” to the real. This 
openness even extends to the recognition that reality surpasses man’s capacity to 
understand it.
127
 
Ratzinger speaks similarly in his citation of Nicolas Cabasilas’ two ways of 
acquiring knowledge. The first way is pedagogical which does not depend on the 
direct experience of things, whereas the second way allows the formation of a 
more certain knowledge and is gained only “through a direct relationship with the 
reality”.128 The two ways can be conceptually distinguished, but they are both 
faculties of the one reason.  To contemplate beauty is in no way “a flight into the 
                                                             
125 Pieper, In Defense of Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges, 15.  
126 Luigi Giussani, The Religious Sense (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press 1997), 97; Cf. Joseph 
Ratzinger, "Funeral Homily for Msgr. Luigi Giussani," Communio 31, no. 4 (2004): Giussani’s 
understanding of reason reflects back on his appreciation of beauty, which is referred to by 
Ratzinger in his funeral homily for Giussani. He says: “Father Giussani grew up in a house that 
was—to use his words— poor in bread but rich in music, so that from the very beginning he was 
touched, or, better, wounded, by the desire for beauty. He was not satisfied, however, with just 
any ordinary beauty, with beauty however banal; he sought rather Beauty itself, infinite Beauty, 
and thus he found Christ. In Christ he found true beauty, the path of life, true joy” (p. 685).  
127 Giussani, The Religious Sense, 132. 
128 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §9. 
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irrational”.129 This is the kind of thinking that reduces the consideration of beauty 
to a mere sentiment. 
Ratzinger contends that one needs the cooperation of reason if he is to recognize 
true beauty. This reason is one that is open to the rational character of the 
experience. He asserts that “We are fighting to expand reason, and hence for a 
reason which, precisely, is also open to the beautiful and does not have to set it 
aside as something quite different and unreasonable”.130 Now, to expand reason 
means to recognise the full capacity of reason to do more than analyse causation, 
process empirical data and calculate logical algorithms.
131
 Indeed, Ratzinger 
suggests that reason can achieve more than linguistic organization and conceptual 
thought. This is shown by its application in the experience of the beautiful. 
According to Ratzinger, the aesthetic experience is a fundmental activity of 
reason, such that, “Reason that intended to strip itself of beauty would be halved, 
it would be a blinded reason”.132  
According to Ratzinger, “man’s being resonates with some things and clashes 
with others”.133 This does not imply that the response to beauty is simply relative, 
but rather, that man is naturally directed towards beauty and needs to become 
aware of his own nature. Ratzinger suggests that one way we can verify this is to 
deeply reflect on our experiences: 
Not all satisfactions have the same effect on us: some leave a positive 
after-taste, able to calm the soul and make us more active and generous. 
Others, however, after the initial delight, seem to disappoint the 
                                                             
129 Ibid., §16.  
130 Benedict XVI, "Meeting of the Holy Father Benedict XVI with the Clergy of the Diocese of 
Bolzano-Bressanone,"  (2008).  
131
 Introduction to Christianity, 59-63. 
132  "Meeting of the Holy Father Benedict XVI with the Clergy of the Diocese of Bolzano-
Bressanone".  
133 "Conscience and Truth," 535. 
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expectations that they had awakened and sometimes leave behind them a 
sense of bitterness, dissatisfaction or emptiness.
134
 
The experience of beauty is one that is considered absolutely rational, but not in 
any restrictive sense of it being calculated or analysed logically, even though it is 
also significance in these terms as one uses reason to reflect on one’s experiences. 
Ultimately, however, the experience of beauty calls for a renewed understanding 
of reason itself; one that sees it not simply as a process of abstraction, but a power 
to appreciate one’s experiences at the level of being.  
 
 
 
2.2  Immanuel Kant 
 
2.2.1  Aesthetic Judgment: Free Play and Universal Validity 
 
Whereas Hume elevates the role of the sentiments and passions, so that at the 
same time reason is in demise, Kant proposes the activity of the mind as the entire 
occupation of man. Kant’s subsumption of experience under the categories of 
abstract ideas leads to the dismissal of metaphysics as a viable means to interpret 
aesthetic judgments. As such, Kant’s aesthetics can be said to have much in 
contrast with Ratzinger’s perspective on beauty. From a reflection on these 
differences we shall see that, for Ratzinger, the recognition of beauty as a 
transcendental is made possible by the heart, the meeting place of the rational and 
the subjective at the centre of man’s being.  
Kant begins his theory of aesthetics in his so-called “third critique”, the Critique 
of Judgment, by positing pleasure as the element by which the judgment of the 
beautiful can be distinguished from any other experience.
135
 This pleasure, he 
                                                             
134 General Audience of Pope Benedict XVI, 7 November 2012. 
135 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, xii.  
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claims, is not merely a physiological response to sensory stimuli, as Hume 
suggests, but something that is produced from the harmonious interaction of the 
senses with the rational faculties of imagination and understanding.
136
 Kant calls 
this interaction “free play” because the understanding is free to unify the various 
aspects of beauty presented by the imagination.
137
 Pleasure, or the feeling of 
satisfaction, is associated with free play because it gives us the impression of 
having arrived at a natural goal of understanding as if in conceptual thought. 
However, the harmony achieved by the imagination and understanding occurs 
without any deference to empirical concepts. Now, whilst we owe the pleasure of 
beauty to an intuition of unity within the mind as if it was forming new concepts, 
any actual conceptual thought fosters interest, which in turn renders the observer 
unable to judge beauty. This is because beauty is only experienced in a state of 
complete disinterestedness.
138
 
Like Hume, Kant wishes to avoid the conclusion that taste is completely relative. 
Therefore, he develops these thoughts further to give an account of the 
intersubjective validity of the judgment of taste. As mentioned, for this judgment 
to be made, one must approach the object with complete disinterestedness. Kant 
believes that when this condition is met, the agent who experiences pleasure in 
the judgment of beauty will necessarily presume that the same judgment will be 
made by anyone else who observes the same object in the same environment. In 
other words, the judgment of pleasure arising from the perception of an object is 
accompanied by a simultaneous a priori judgment that this pleasure will be 
experienced by all others.
139
  
In other words, if one were to think to oneself: “This object is wonderfully 
beautiful, but I’m sure my sister wouldn’t find it beautiful,” it could be said that 
he has not experienced beauty at all, but has mistaken for the judgment of taste a 
pleasure owing to some other interest. This is because, according to Kant, the 
                                                             
136
 Ibid., 52. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., 179. 
139 Ibid., 147.  
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judgment of beauty necessarily supposes universal validity.
140
 He says, “in a 
judgment of taste, the pleasure which we feel is imputed to others as necessary, 
just as if it were a property of the object, determined to [belong to] it according to 
concept”.141 This can be considered Kant’s way of ensuring that the judgment of 
taste is not simply seen as a relative construct that differs without rule from 
subject to subject.  
Now, the question arises: does Kant believe that a genuine encounter with beauty 
actually results in universal agreement in practice? That is, if one approaches an 
object with disinterestedness and feels a pleasure accompanied by a judgment of 
universal validity, does it mean everyone will agree with it in reality? If so, then 
we are living in different worlds, or nobody could claim to have properly 
experienced beauty, simply given the fact that opinions vary as to whether 
something is beautiful or not. Well, actually, Kant clarifies that “The universal 
voice” is only an “idea”, such that: 
…he who believes himself to be making a judgment of taste actually 
judges in accord with this idea, may be uncertain; but that he relates his 
judgment to such an idea, insofar as it is a judgment of taste, it is 
proclaimed by his expression of “beauty”. For himself he can be certain 
through his mere consciousness of the abstraction of everything pertaining 
to the agreeable and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this 
is all for which he promises himself the agreement of everyone: a claim 
which under these conditions he would also be justified in making, were it 
not that he often sinned against them and therefore made an erroneous 
judgment of taste.
142
 
The judgment of universal validity is therefore only an assumption that 
accompanies the judgment of the beautiful, which does not actually imply the 
agreement of subjective tastes in practice. The apparent discrepancies in taste are 
                                                             
140
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 8-9, 111-12. 
141 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, §9, 219, quoted in Guyer, Kant and the Claims of 
Taste, 143 (Brackets Guyer’s). 
142 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, §8, 216, quoted in Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 129. 
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attributed to erroneous judgments. This occurs when the pleasure one feels is 
improperly attributed to the beauty of an object, that is, when the object is not 
approached with disinterestedness. So, in such cases, the pleasure that is 
mistakenly attributed to beauty actually comes about from the satisfaction of 
some other interest.
143
 Kant stands by his theory of universal validity and 
considers it an important aspect of the judgment of taste as an a priori judgment.  
On the one hand, Kant presents the judgment of taste as a subjective experience 
that does not correspond to determinate properties of the object, such as symmetry 
or colour.
144
 On the other hand, for the universality of the judgment to apply to 
other subjects, even from a subjective non-practical standpoint, there is a need for 
grounding the judgment on a broader concept that incorporates both the 
experience of the subject and the object considered on its own.  Kant proposes a 
solution in “the concept of the supersensible”, which becomes the transcendental 
ground for “the object (and the judging subject as well) as object of sense, and 
thus as appearance”.145 He considers the supersensible sufficient to resolve the 
conflict, for provided the concept is indeterminate, the judgment of taste is not 
dependent on a particular property of objects.
146
 Now, the supersensible is a 
concept which “cannot be determined by intuition, through which nothing can be 
known, and thus also from which no proof of the judgment of taste can be 
drawn”.147  
However, in postulating the perception of beauty by mediation of a transcendental 
in Kant’s own understanding of the term, Kant moves the aesthetic judgment into 
                                                             
143 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 129-30. 
144 Beauty can only be considered the grammatical subject and predicate of the object, “as if it 
were a property of the object”. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §9, 219, quoted in Guyer, Kant and 
the Claims of Taste, 143; Cf Guyer, p. 119.  
145 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, §57, 339-340, quoted in Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 
301. For Kant, the term "transcendental” denotes the perspective by which a priori concepts are 
accepted despite pertaining to the noumenon (which is beyond the boundary of knowledge).  
146 Ibid., 308.; Cf. The Critique of Judgement, §57, 340-341. 
147 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, §57, 339-340, quoted in Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 
301. 
 41 
 
the realm of metaphysics, and therefore goes beyond self-imposed conditions of 
subjective epistemology.
148
 Despite this internal inconsistency, Kant maintains 
that beauty is not a metaphysical reality but rather the subjective experience of 
pleasure conditioned by disinterestedness and universal validity. As with Hume, 
then, it becomes apparent that Kant’s supposition of subjective validity is 
problematic without a metaphysical foundation. 
 
2.2.2  Ratzinger’s Response: The Heart 
 
What Kant considers unknowable, is for Ratzinger, truly knowable in the heart. 
Indeed, Ratzinger proposes that the heart, rather than the mind, is the primary 
faculty of man. This is because the heart is the centre of man as a whole, 
inseparably body, soul and spirit.
149
 It is in the heart that the senses unite with the 
emotions.
150
 
Ratzinger refers to Origen’s adaptation of the Stoic concept of hēgemonikon, 
which is the guiding energy of logos dwelling in man’s heart. Here, heart expands 
beyond reason to a deeper reality that has direct connection with the divine.
151
 As 
such, Ratzinger asserts that the encounter with beauty is more than a momentary 
pleasure arising from disinterest. The experience of beauty imparts a knowledge 
of truth which is felt and intuited by the heart in a manner that is rational and yet 
beyond reason. Therefore, Ratzinger explains that the “impact produced by the 
response of the heart in the encounter with beauty” is “true knowledge”.152  
                                                             
148 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 304. Again, transcendental here implies Kantian sense of 
a perspective concerning the things-in-themselves rather than in the medieval sense of properties 
convertible with being. Guyer believes that the metaphysical solution to the dialectic is 
unnecessary and suggests that Kant could have simply discarded the supersensible altogether and 
so avoid overstepping “the limits of his own epistemology” (p. 311). 
149
 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology, 60-61.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Ibid., 67-68.  
152 "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §11. 
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Ratzinger adds to the understanding of the heart by referring to John Henry 
Newman’s motto, “heart speaks to heart”, as well as the words of Blaise Pascal, 
“The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of... We know the truth 
not only by the reason, but by the heart”. 153  Both Newman and Pascal are 
speaking of the knowledge of God, which Ratzinger considers to be true 
knowledge. Romano Guardini expands upon Pascal’s treatment of the heart, and 
given that Guardini’s influence on Ratzinger is undeniable, we will briefly 
examine the contribution of Guardini here..
154
  
Guardini explains that the faculty of the heart is associated with the appreciating 
mind, whilst the faculty of reason is concerned with the theoretical mind. 
Nevertheless, both are “mind”, and so can be properly considered receptive to 
knowledge. Like Ratzinger, Guardini’s reflection on the heart centres upon the 
knowledge of the truth, especially the truths of the faith. Guardini even suggests 
that this is the kind of knowledge which fulfills a person: 
…the element of value in the divine: the ‘highest good’; that which, in the 
nearness of God, is unique, inwardly stirring, which fulfills. That, in other 
words, which modern philosophy of religion calls the quality of the 
‘numinous’, the value of the ‘sacred’.155  
Guardini continues his reflection on Pascal by giving a hierarchical presentation 
of knowledge: 
…just as Augustine only became clearly aware of this state of affairs 
when he had found the faith, and was in a position to judge from this 
higher level of knowledge the possibilities of the lower level, so it was the 
event of the Memorial which gave Pascal, along with the experience of the 
state of spiritual knowledge, also the judgment about the accomplishment 
and limitation of the earlier kind of knowledge [ie. the rational arguments]. 
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The state of affairs often referred to already recurs: existence is 
constructed in levels. The significance and possibilities of the lower 
disclose themselves fully only on the higher level. Life cannot be 
understood from the bottom up, that is, in a naturalistic way or according 
to a theory of evolution, but only from the top down, that is, 
hierarchically.
156
   
When God is perceived in the beauty of nature, one begins to see with a new eye, 
a new “vue” opens up, or what Guardini refers to as, “the pneumatic illumination 
of mind and heart in faith”.157 From this perspective, one stands high enough to 
see clearly all that belongs to the lower tiers of knowledge. This is a key 
consequence of beauty’s transcendental convertibility with truth. That is, the 
impact of beauty on our hearts can become a guide to the truth. Ratzinger 
emphasizes this when he says,  
The encounter with the beautiful can become the wound of the arrow that 
strikes the heart and in this way opens our eyes, so that later, from this 
experience, we take the criteria for judgement and can correctly evaluate 
the arguments.
158
 
The heart wounded by beauty can have such a deep knowledge of the truth that it 
becomes capable of being an arbiter of reason. This means that when we 
encounter beauty, reason is not put aside, but rather it is broadened so as to make 
a judgment from a higher level. For Ratzinger, this is demonstrated in his own 
personal experience of beauty. Again, referring to the Bach cantata conducted by 
Leonard Bernstein, he says, 
The music had such an extraordinary force of reality that we realized, no 
longer by deduction, but by the impact of our hearts, that it could not have 
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originated from nothingness, but could only have come to be through the 
power of the Truth that became real in the composer's inspiration.
159
 
Ratzinger thus proclaims that beauty is a means for the judgment of truth in all 
matters because it is real knowledge that impacts the heart. We can then add this 
to the understanding of beauty as an encounter that wounds the beholder and 
leaves him yearning for truth. The heart’s capacity to know this truth through the 
power of beauty means that this yearning is not in vain. 
 
2.3.1  Kant and the Sublime 
 
It would be unfair to say that Kant considers beauty a simple pleasure of no value, 
for the judgment of taste points to an aspect of knowledge for Kant as well; and 
that is the knowledge of practical reason. However, the aesthetic signification of 
morality occurs primarily in the sublime, which is another aspect of the judgment 
of taste in addition to the beautiful. The sublime offers an interesting parallel to 
the connection between morality and aesthetics based on the transcendental 
metaphysics that underpins Ratzinger’s aesthetics. According to Kant, the sublime 
describes the state of pleasure associated with encountering something of great 
magnitude or something perceivably threatening.
160
 We have said that the 
pleasure associated with beauty arises from free play of the understanding and 
imagination. In the sublime, the mechanism by which we feel that pleasure is 
more complex because it involves a component of displeasure. Kant explains that 
whereas “the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of life, and is thus 
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compatible with charms and a playful imagination,” in the experience of the 
sublime, “the mind is not simply attracted but also alternately repelled by it”.161  
Kant explains that the faculty of understanding contributes to empirical 
knowledge but is limited to logical analysis and conceptual thought. The faculty 
of reason, on the other hand, is the highest faculty of the mind and is able to unify 
the manifolds of sensibility, as well as inquire into both theoretical and practical 
properties of reality.
162
 In the sublime, the experience is so overwhelming that the 
understanding is unable to unify the experience in guiding the imagination. This 
means that instead of initiating the process of free play, the sublime calls upon the 
higher faculty of reason. However, the imagination is unable to synthesise the 
sensory information to satisfy the enquiry of reason, which leads to frustration 
and displeasure.
163
 Nevertheless, this painful feeling of frustration and inadequacy 
is only short-lived, for it paradoxically gives way to an appreciation of one’s own 
subjective reason as being superior to any perceivably threatening experience, and 
this is what causes the eventual pleasure.  
There are two distinct situations in which one experiences the sublime. The 
mathematical sublime occurs when one encounters a numerical series or 
measurement, which overwhelms the observer by its sheer magnitude. However, 
in acknowledging the inadequacy of the imagination to represent the infinitely 
large, the theoretical reason becomes aware of its own dominance over the 
imagination, and this recognition results in pleasure.
164
 In other words, the feeling 
of awe and pleasure in the experience of the mathematical sublime is a result of 
our appreciation of the faculty of reason over and above the incalculably vast. 
Kant explains that it is precisely because reason is able to recognize itself in the 
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face of something inestimably large that it is able to exert the “supremacy of the 
rational determination of our cognitive faculties over the greatest power of 
sensibility”.165  
Unlike the beautiful, the judgment of the sublime is not grammatically 
attributable to any object.
166
 That is, the sublime is not a term with which we can 
describe a scene or object, but simply an experience. Therefore, one cannot say 
“this object or scene is sublime”, but only “I feel the sublime in observing this 
scene”. Kant also explains that the experience of the sublime is merely associated 
with the subjective feelings generated, such that the object’s “existence is a matter 
of indifference to us”. 167  He suggests therefore that an awesomely fearful 
representation of nature only plays a causal role in evoking a certain “disposition 
of the soul”. 168  This explains how, in the mathematical sublime, the “mere 
magnitude, even if it is regarded as formless is able to convey a universally 
communicable delight”.169  
A similar effect is experienced in the dynamical sublime, which occurs when a 
powerful scene in nature incites a response of fear but the scene is simultaneously 
judged by the practical reason as non-threatening. An example of this can be 
given in the case of seeing out to a stormy sea from the shore. If the practical 
reason recognises that the storm is at a safe distance, then the observer would 
experience a counter pleasure that overcomes the initial awe and fear. The 
experience of the dynamical sublime, then, owes itself to the practical reason, 
which not only discloses the very existence of reason but asserts its superiority 
over nature, resulting in "soul-stirring delight”.170  
According to Kant, the recognition of sublimity is embedded in our nature, but it 
is dependent on the disposition of the practical reason which is one’s sense of 
morality. The mathematical sublime, in encountering the infinitely great, reveals 
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the inexhaustible scope of reason, whilst the dynamical sublime, in confronting 
the might of the natural world, represents the autonomy of reason.
171
 This 
autonomy of reason over and above nature confirms that we can exercise our 
practical reason freely in spite of what appears to be a natural boundary. 
According to Kant, the sublime represents the reason’s “superiority over nature 
on which is founded a self-preservation of quite another kind than which may be 
attacked and brought into danger by the nature outside us, one where the 
humanity in our own person remains undefeated”.172 It allows us to believe that 
nature is a “might that has no dominion over us”, and hence helps support Kant’s 
notion that our moral freedom is always preserved by the supremacy of practical 
reason.
173
 
The judgment of beauty signifies the rational condition of morality by disclosing 
pleasure as the natural consequence of disinterestedness, which then “teaches us 
to find a free delight in objects of the senses without the charm of sense”.174 In 
other words, the experience of pleasure in one’s disinterested approach to an 
object analogously represents the rational condition of acting in response to duty 
rather than from any other interest. Paradoxically, however, moral signification in 
the beautiful is limited because deontic morality is at odds with the prospect of 
pleasure as a reward. The sublime overcomes this tension precisely because it has 
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the element of pain and displeasure. This means that the signification of moral 
aptitude is much stronger in the sublime.
175
 
For Kant, aesthetic taste symbolizes morality and not the other way around, but he 
proposes that moral principles set the standards by which aesthetic taste is 
developed. He says, “The true propaedeutic for the grounding of taste is the 
development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling: for only when these 
are brought into accord with sensibility can genuine taste assume a determinate, 
constant form”.176 As such, one’s moral inclinations are represented in our taste 
for beautiful art.
177
 For Kant, morality is exemplified in deontic principles and so 
one’s response to duty is represented in the disinterested attitude required for the 
judgment of taste.   
In summary, Kant suggests that the judgment of beauty is dependent on the 
observer’s disinterestedness which helps distinguish the judgment from a pleasure 
arising from the consideration of the object’s utility. The disposition of 
disinterestedness is ameliorated by acting in accordance with moral duty or 
practical reason, but Kant adds that the connection between morality and 
aesthetics is mostly unidirectional in the aesthetic judgment’s signification of the 
deontic moral principle. This makes for an interesting comparison with 
Ratzinger’s understanding of the moral-aesthetic connection, which is neither 
dependent on disinterestedness nor deontic principles. This relationship between 
beauty and moral goodness will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
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2.3.2  Ratzinger on Beauty and Morality  
 
According to Ratzinger, beauty is a transcendental, convertible with both the true 
and the good. With regards to morality, then, beauty signifies and affects one’s 
disposition towards moral goodness and vice versa. Therefore, Ratzinger suggests 
that excellent moral habits and frequent exposure to beautiful things have a 
mutual affect on the disposition for and appreciation of the other. The negative 
correlation also holds true, such that a culture smothered in ugliness sways further 
away from receptivity to the moral truth, and a morally corrupt society becomes 
blind and unable to recognize the beautiful, thereby establishing a vicious cycle.  
For Ratzinger, this short-sightedness in aesthetic and moral sensibilities has its 
roots in the notion of subjective existence in accordance with Kant’s elevation of 
the reason and the subjective mind as the supreme power over nature. Ratzinger 
argues that if everything is subjective then “truth and absolute points of reference 
do not exist” and “this way of thinking does not lead to true freedom, but rather to 
instability, confusion and blind conformity to the fads of the moment”. 178 
Ultimately, the “fads” take the form of a relative moral order facilitated by the 
“fragility of consensuses” and imposed by those who “assert their claim to be the 
sole rightful representatives of progress and responsibility”.179 Ratzinger therefore 
asserts that “the reduction to experience traps the human person in the subjective”, 
for when one’s subjective senses and reflections are not held together with the 
objective truths of reality, an attitude of subjective relativity attack goodness and 
beauty.
180
 
The resultant moral relativity that dominates the culture attenuates our ability to 
recognise the beautiful, and the lack of appreciation for the beautiful in turn 
blinds us further from the recognition of moral truth. These are features of what 
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Ratzinger calls “anti-culture” or "an overbearing cultural bias,” which distorts 
man’s ability to recognise the transcendentals.181 He says,  
….contemporary mankind is characterized by disunity, by a superficial 
coexistence and a hostility that are based on self-divinization. As a result, 
everything is seen in a false perspective.
182
 
Ratzinger purports that we are often brought down to our carnal instincts by the 
cacophony of banal stimuli. He claims that “Our world is so full of what 
immediately impinges on our senses that we are in danger of seeing only the parts 
and losing sight of the whole”.183 If the tendency toward selfishness is unabated, 
one may end up “full of the rubbish of his own cares and interests”, and so 
become unable to hear the voice of the transcendent which requires a pure heart 
and an open soul.
184
 
Therefore, Ratzinger urges people to appreciate the truth of faith and to the truth 
of morality, not primarily by demands and cries to conform but by proposing a 
culture of beauty. As mentioned, an exposure to beauty not only cultivates our 
taste for the beautiful, but it also sharpens our perception of the good and the true. 
Ratzinger explains that, “beauty, a kind of mirror of the divine, inspires and 
vivifies young hearts and minds, while ugliness and coarseness have a depressing 
impact on attitudes and behaviour”.185 If morality affects our vision of beauty, 
then our aesthetic experience affects our alignment with what is truly moral. This 
is in line with Augustine and Bonaventure’s idea that when encountering the 
beautiful, we ourselves are made beautiful, and when it gazes at the hideous it is 
made hideous.
186
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Ratzinger suggests that since man grows and develops within a culture, a good 
cultural education in beauty is possible through “a kind of pedagogy of desire”, 
which may help open the heart to the transcendental dimension. On the practical 
level, Ratzinger proposes the following: 
Instilling in someone from a young age the taste for true joy, in every area 
of life – family, friendship, solidarity with those who suffer, self-
renunciation for the sake of the other, love of knowledge, art, the beauty 
of nature — all this means exercising the inner taste and producing 
antibodies that can fight the trivialization and the dulling widespread 
today. Adults too need to rediscover this joy, to desire authenticity, to 
purify themselves of the mediocrity that might infest them.
187
 
This is the via pulchritudinis, the way of beauty, mentioned in the first chapter as 
beauty’s inspired path to the knowledge of transcendent joy. Ratzinger hopes that 
we may come to know the importance of education concerning beauty in art and 
nature and so be able “to discover or rediscover the taste of the authentic joy of 
life”.188 With regards to art, Ratzinger pays particular attention to the value of 
icons and Christian masterpieces which can set us on “on an inner way, a way of 
overcoming ourselves”, making the “purification of vision that is a purification of 
the heart”.189  
Artists, then, have a prominent role to play in the restoration of authentic beauty 
in culture. Ratzinger therefore reminds artists that their task is “to awaken wonder 
and the desire for the beautiful, to form the sensibility of souls and to nourish a 
passion for all that is an authentic expression of the human genius and a reflection 
of divine Beauty”.190  
The encounter with the infinite can also be had in our experience of beauty in 
nature. This means societies must preserve the beauty of nature by working to 
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create a balanced urban landscape. This is the responsibility of every one of us, to 
bring to the fore the beautiful in art and nature so that a culture of joy 
flourishes.
191
  
In order to create such a culture of beauty, Ratzinger expresses that beauty must 
be sought for itself and each person must exercise adequate discipline to this end. 
He explains that beauty is “endlessly comforting precisely because it has no 
compulsion to be useful, because it does not owe its existence to a leisure we have 
devised for our own”.192 This disinterestedness is not a criteria for a judgment of 
pleasure elevating the subjective mind as Kant suggest, but rather, the evidence 
that beauty precedes man and his desire to make use of things for himself. Indeed, 
beauty does not need to be justified, and yet the contemporary world demands a 
reason for it. This is the result of a culture driven by positivism convincing the 
people that a scientific rationality is the main paradigm for generating meaning in 
material progress, and because the frequent abuse of beauty such as its 
manipulation for the sake of pomp, power and profit has bred profound 
cynicism.
193
  
Ratzinger borrows ideas from Paul Evdokimov to comment on how we might be 
able to avoid the temptation to desire material progress alone as well as to avoid 
the bane of cynicism by purifying our hearts through meditative prayer. 
Evdokimov calls this prayer “a fasting of sight” whereby one is able then to see 
with one’s heart also and not only with his eyes. An Eastern Christian 
iconographer must engage in such a prayer when creating an icon, for “An icon 
does not simply reproduce what can be perceived by the senses”.194 Ratzinger 
explains that:  
Inner perception must free itself from the impression of the merely 
sensible, and in prayer and ascetical effort acquire a new and deeper 
capacity to see, to perform the passage from what is merely external to the 
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profundity of reality, in such a way that the artist can see what the senses 
as such do not see, and what actually appears in what can be perceived: 
the splendour of the glory of God…195 
This silent contemplation becomes a “purification of vision that is a purification 
of the heart”, and the iconographer becomes capable of seeing “an inner way, a 
way of overcoming ourselves”.196 This silent contemplation can then help the 
heart reach the same purity of vision that then renders it capable of perceiving the 
beauty that is at once true and good.  
Consistent with his thoughts on anamnesis and the arrow of beauty which can 
lead us to the infinite, Ratzinger advises that individuals should aim to nurture a 
healthy restlessness for “a higher good, a deeper good — and at the same time to 
perceive ever more clearly that no finite thing can fill our heart”.197 Exposing 
oneself to the beauty of art and nature must go hand in hand with the desire for 
transcendent beauty. We will be able to perceive this deeper goodness and truth in 
beauty if our hearts are prepared to receive it.  
In summary, Ratzinger’s conception of beauty is not one which is simply 
connected to morality by way of signification. It is far more relevant to the moral 
realm than that, for to experience the beautiful is to see the truth and to be 
directed towards moral good. In order to perceive the beautiful, however, one 
must purify his heart so that it is not dismissive and cynical. A culture that allows 
for this purification is one where authentic beauty is enjoyed from a young age 
and where each person is encouraged to reflect upon his feelings and experiences. 
By such means, one may be able to live the moral life and hence become beautiful 
themselves, and not only that but be referred to “another beauty, truth and 
goodness whose perfection and ultimate source is in God alone”.198  
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PART III - Beauty and Existence 
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3.1  Friedrich Nietzsche  
 
3.1.1  Greek Tragedy and the Dionysian 
 
Ratzinger and Nietzsche are both critical thinkers who find the aesthetic 
experience absolutely crucial in the contemplation of the deepest questions of 
existence. Ratzinger, however, finds many errors in Nietzsche’s thoughts, 
especially concerning the nature and meaning of eros, and in addition to exposing 
these problems to light, Ratzinger forwards a counterargument in favour of 
Christianity and Platonic metaphysics. 
Nietzsche proposes that ancient Greek tragedy is the pre-eminent art form, 
because, unlike the hollow and fake beauty of Christianity and classical music, 
Greek tragedy affirms life as it is, with all its suffering and evil.
199
 Nietzsche 
believes that it is from tragedy that we can derive "the solace that in the ground of 
things, and despite all changing appearances, life is indestructibly mighty and 
pleasurable".
200
 He therefore asserts that “art – and not morality – is the true 
metaphysical activity of man”, and that “Indeed, the world is justified 
(gerechtfertigt) only as an aesthetic phenomenon”. 201  Furthermore, “art is a 
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saving sorceress, expert at healing. She alone knows how to turn these nauseous 
thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one 
can live”.202 
The Greeks achieve this by the presentation of the Dionysian which expresses the 
excesses of life full of “contradiction, bliss born of pain”.203 However, Nietzsche 
notes that the Dionysian itself lacks logical form and so must be expressed in the 
Apollonian veil of “rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through 
art and knowledge”.204 That is, the Apollonian allows the representation of the 
otherwise unrepresentable.
205
 Nietzsche suggests that this is most poignantly 
exemplified in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. In the chorus of their 
tragedies, the sublime Dionysian movements are presented through the measured 
beauty of Apollonian forms.
206
 When the Dionysian breaks forth the Apollonian 
is "submerged”.207 In other words, the Apollonian serves to present the tragedy as 
art, but it is only when the Dionysian is released that the truly tragic element 
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comes to the fore.
208
 Dionysus, suffering at the hands of fate, is revealed as the 
“real stage hero and centre of the vision,” and the spectator is confronted with a 
vision of a hero in agony, inspiring him to affirm life in an arbitrary world, which, 
though without meaning, is certainly not without the joy and beauty of the arts.
209
  
It is clear, then, that Nietzsche wishes to affirm life through the joy of Dionysian 
ecstasies and not by the Apollonian forms. The highest function of the Apollonian 
is to help man affirm the chaotic ugliness and unrelenting suffering in the 
Dionysian. The beautiful form of Apollo is merely a pretence to the world of 
becoming that underlies reality.  
 
3.1.2  Ratzinger’s Response to Nietzsche and the Dionysian  
 
Ratzinger counters Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the Dionysian by saying that the 
Dionysian music now heard in contemporary parties and festivals typify the forms 
of “anti-culture”, orientated towards “the pleasure of destruction, the abolition of 
everyday barriers, and the illusion of liberation from the ego in the wild ecstasy of 
noise and masses”. 210  Ratzinger identifies rock music in particular as the re-
emergence of the Dionysian element stemming from African pagan music.
211
 He 
suggests that this music intends to immerse the listener in sensual intoxication and 
leaves the spirit dull and anaesthetised.
212
 In the Dionysian experience, “Man 
frees himself … from the burden of consciousness. Music becomes ecstasy, 
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liberation from the ego, and unification with the universe”.213 Ratzinger explains 
that the Dionysian represents “the deceptive beauty that makes the human being 
seem diminished instead of making him great, and for this reason is false”.214  
This criticism of the Dionysian is founded on something deeper than subjective 
dislike of rock music. Ratzinger’s claim is that Dionysian music hinders the 
transcendent experience because its nature reflects a metaphysical distortion, a 
false perspective of reality that favours ugliness over beauty.
215
 This distortion is 
connected to a false sense of eros; one which “crushes rationality” and “subjects 
the spirit to the senses”.216  
Ratzinger charges the Greeks of practicing this “dehumanizing” and “counterfeit” 
form of eros in their custom of exploiting prostitutes in the temple for the 
kindling of “divine madness”.217 Nietzsche subscribes to this understanding of 
eros, seeing in it a possessive sexual desire that denigrates the spiritual.
218
 
Ratzinger then explains that true eros is one that does not simply seek earthly 
pleasures, but an eros that “tends to rise ‘in ecstasy’ towards the Divine, to lead us 
beyond ourselves; yet for this very reason it calls for a path of ascent, 
renunciation, purification and healing”.219 This is a passion that is “disciplined 
and purified”, so that it can have the potential to “provide not just fleeting 
pleasure, but a certain foretaste of the pinnacle of our existence, of that beatitude 
for which our whole being yearns”.220  
The true eros is enkindled by a form in conformity with logos, that is, profoundly 
ordered to reason. Ratzinger explains that such a form promotes the simultaneous 
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“spiritualization of the flesh” and the “corporealization into the body” and is able 
to overcome the “warped and destructive form of [eros]”.221 By allowing the 
intimate union of soul and body, a form in accordance with reason prepares man 
for the ascending love of eros. This is appropriate because, “it is neither the spirit 
alone nor the body alone that loves”.222 Rather, as Ratzinger explains, “…it is 
man, the person, a unified creature composed of body and soul, who loves. Only 
when both dimensions are truly united, does man attain his full stature. Only thus 
is love —eros— able to mature and attain its authentic grandeur”.223 
Ratzinger asks, “Does [music] integrate man by drawing him to what is above, or 
does it cause his disintegration into formless intoxication or mere sensuality?”224 
When one hears the music of logos, the senses are not abandoned but drawn into 
the wholeness of his being and thus reaches a spiritual dimension. As both spirit 
and sense enrich each other, it becomes “an expression of man's special place in 
the general structure of being”.225 This is what makes rational music beautiful, 
because it brings together the flesh and spirit. It behaves as a catalyst for bringing 
about a unification of man’s being, ultimately drawing his whole being up to the 
transcendent. Whereas Dionysian revelry works against one’s unity of soul and 
body by reducing him to chaotic revelry, the music of logos “permits joy… a 
higher kind of ecstasy which does not extinguish the person but unites and thus 
liberates him”.226 
It may be argued that Ratzinger is chiefly concerned with identifying what is 
suitable for liturgical music and that as a result his comments do not pertain to 
aesthetics as such. It is true that Ratzinger calls for the exclusion of rock music 
from the Church’s liturgy, but as already mentioned, this is not out of subjective 
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whim, but precisely based on the consideration of aesthetics, that is, the music’s 
underlying metaphysical character.
227
 In other words, Ratzinger gives liturgical 
music metaphysical justification; identifying in it a metaphysical aesthetic theory 
where the objective reality of beauty is presented as a transcendental on par with 
truth and goodness. 
This also means that Ratzinger rejects Schopenhauer’s proposition that music, as 
pure will, is anterior to reason.
228
 Ratzinger sides with Guardini in claiming that 
precedence clearly lies in truth, that is, logos, and not in the will, which represents 
ethos.
229
 Of course, art forms other than music are also capable of reflecting this 
priority of logos over ethos. Indeed, the reasoned beauty that reflects the truth of 
reality is also perceptible in architecture, visual arts and in literature.
230
 Ratzinger 
explains that logos, the truth of being, is the standard by which art reflects the 
relationship of cosmic laws and so becomes a channel for man to achieve 
harmony in his own being. On the other hand, anarchistic theories of art where the 
subject takes precedence leaves man direly in want of this unison. Accordingly, 
for artwork to be beautiful it must be created in agreement with logos.
231
  
For Ratzinger, the role of beauty in art is to express the mystery of God, but in 
doing so it also expresses the mystery of man.
232
 This is because man, as reason 
and heart, finds his personhood and being in logos. In other words, man is not 
defined primarily by his pragma, his works, but rather, by his being, his 
personhood, received from another in history and in God.
 233
 Ratzinger says that, 
Christian art is a rational art - let us think of Gothic art or of the great 
music or even, precisely, of our own Baroque art - but it is the artistic 
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expression of a greatly expanded reason, in which heart and reason 
encounter each other.
234
  
Now, if logos is what gives art its beauty, then an ordered Apollonian beauty 
divorced from truth cannot be truly beautiful. The kind of beauty that only 
appeals to a surface pleasure or base motives actually degrades the ideal of beauty 
by divorcing it from truth and love: 
A beauty that is deceptive and false, a dazzling beauty that does not bring 
human beings out of themselves to open them to the ecstasy of rising to 
the heights, but indeed locks them entirely into themselves. Such beauty 
does not reawaken a longing for the Ineffable, readiness for sacrifice, the 
abandonment of self, but instead stirs up the desire, the will for power, 
possession and pleasure. 
235
 
For Ratzinger, the reality of transcendental beauty must be separated from the 
breathtaking effect of counterfeit beauty. The latter is represented in 
advertisements created with the aim of deceiving man by appealing to his senses. 
These false forms of beauty are almost irresistible, making the observer “want to 
grab everything and seek the passing satisfaction rather than be open to others”.236  
This critique of aestheticism seems to follow the thoughts of Dostoevsky, who is 
often mentioned in Ratzinger’s comments on beauty.237 According to Dostoevsky, 
even the devout man finds it difficult to separate himself from the intensity of 
sensuous beauty. He calls it the “mysterious as well as terrible” power of the 
“beauty of Sodom” which is able to deceive and tempt the “immense mass of 
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mankind”.238 He therefore says that, “God and the devil are fighting there and the 
battlefield is the heart of man”.239 Dostoevsky does not give a simple explanation 
for the power of selfish and sensual beauty; it remains a mystery. Yet nor does he 
brush the problem aside. He says that it is the “ideal of the Madonna”, the beauty 
that is both sorrowful in sin and yet rejoicing in hope, which is the true standard 
towards which man strives in the ongoing battle against self-gratification.
240
 
Ratzinger notes that today’s culture is “not always propitious for accepting a 
beauty in full harmony with truth and goodness”, and yet he is greatly hopeful for 
the ultimate triumph of transcendental beauty. This is because Ratzinger 
recognises that man will always be “desirous of, and nostalgic for, a genuine 
beauty that is neither superficial nor ephemeral”.241 In the next section we shall 
consider whether this is a hope worth holding onto in the face of all the ugliness 
in the world and in its history. 
 
3.2  Theodor Adorno  
3.2.1 Ugliness and Pessimism 
 
Nietzsche clearly rejects the transcendental notion of beauty, and yet he remains 
sensitive to the significance of the aesthetic experience. In his critique on modern 
music, Nietzsche explains that both popular music and what he calls “advanced 
music” transcend the classical favouring of beauty over ugliness. Here, whereas 
popular music returns to the sensuality of the primitive and Dionysian cults, 
advanced music takes on ugly forms with the aim of achieving symbolic 
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meaning.
242
 This means that, for Nietzsche, the experience of the ugly confers 
more meaning than the beautiful.
243
  
Like Nietzsche, Adorno proposes a theory of art where ugliness has priority over 
beauty. A major difference, however, is that Adorno pays little attention to the 
Greek myth of Dionysus. Rather, he stresses that the ugly in art is associated with 
the moral realm and manifests man’s socio-political history. In particular, he 
points to the moral atrocities of World War II as a burden too heavy for humanity 
to express its history adequately through art. The sheer degree and extent of 
suffering caused by fellow man in the Holocaust exceeds any attempt to give it 
expression, such that one is no longer even capable of writing poetry without 
being barbaric.
244
 
Furthermore, Adorno believes it is unjust for one to express joy after the 
Holocaust, and for the same reason, art can no longer be made beautiful. Adorno 
proscribes any kind of “cheerful art” and the forms of poetry that glorify suffering, 
as they constitute an “injustice to the dead; to accumulated, speechless pain”.245  
On the other hand, Adorno does not desire the ultimate demise of art in general. 
Far from censuring art, Adorno wishes that art be considered even more important 
for its radical connection with human suffering. Art maintains this connection 
when it destroys illusions of harmony and becomes a form of social criticism. 
However, this is only possible with ugly art. In fact, Adorno claims that man’s 
historical condition demands that art be ugly.
246
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Ugly art criticises man’s socio-political history by conveying a truth that is not 
rational, that is, it opposes the kind of post-enlightenment rationalistic thinking 
which justifies the kind of progress exemplified by the atom-bomb.
247
 Adorno 
provides a metaphysical grounding for the ugly, suggesting that the ugly, rather 
than beauty, is able to express history truthfully because ugliness is the primal 
reality of which beauty is a negation.
248
 In other words, true aesthetic experience 
is of the ugly and not of the beautiful.  
In opposition to Plato, Adorno describes the aesthetic experience as “shocks of 
incomprehension” that “illuminate the meaningless world”. 249 For Adorno, the 
Platonic transcendence experienced in the shock of beauty is but an illusion which 
entraps man to self-repression. Adorno’s existential negativity is perhaps best 
expressed in the lines: 
Even the blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen without the 
shadow of terror; even the innocent “How lovely!” becomes an excuse for 
an existence outrageously unlovely, and there is no longer beauty or 
consolation except in the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and in 
unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding fast to the possibility of 
what is better.
250
 
One can see that Adorno’s overwhelming disappointment in history is reflected in 
the deep pessimism of his aesthetics. According to Adorno, the classical tonality 
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of Mozart and Beethoven create the illusion of assurance regarding a transcendent 
world. This type of music effectively lies to man by reconfirming the status quo. 
This explains Adorno’s admiration for Schoenberg’s twelve-tone-technique, 
which “moves emphatically towards the dissolution of art” by the expression of 
“lonely subjectivity which withdraws into itself”. 251  According to Adorno, 
Schoenberg’s atonal compositions represent the end of music in the sense that it 
reaches its telos of self-negation. That is, Schoenberg’s music liberates music 
from its very self so that it simply represents the “dissociation of meaning and 
expression”.252  
The self-negation of Schoenberg’s music also allows man to recognize the 
possibility of his own emancipation from repressive self-identity.
253
 Here, 
Adorno’s pessimism is redoubled considering that even this desired liberation is 
only a possibility and no certitude. This exemplifies the potential for ugly art to 
signify pessimistic implosion and metaphysical emptiness.  
 
3.2.2   Ugliness According to Ratzinger 
 
In response to Adorno’s negative critique on transcendent beauty, Ratzinger also 
asks “Whether beauty is true, or whether it is not ugliness that leads to the deepest 
reality”, and “Can the beautiful be genuine, or, in the end, is it only an illusion? 
Isn't reality perhaps basically evil?” 254  Ratzinger treats Adorno’s critique 
seriously because he accepts the existence of a real relationship between morality 
and aesthetics. He makes this acknowledgement especially clear when he says, 
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The fear that in the end it is not the arrow of the beautiful that leads us to 
the truth, but that falsehood, all that is ugly and vulgar, may constitute the 
true "reality" has at all times caused people anguish. At present this has 
been expressed in the assertion that after Auschwitz it was no longer 
possible to write poetry…255  
Ratzinger, like Adorno, accepts that the classical notion of beauty in Apollonian 
forms is not enough to deal with the history of human suffering exemplified so 
brutally in the Holocaust. Ratzinger says,  
This objection, which seemed reasonable enough before Auschwitz when 
one realized all the atrocities of history, shows that in any case a purely 
harmonious concept of beauty is not enough. It cannot stand up to the 
confrontation with the gravity of the questioning about God, truth and 
beauty. Apollo, who for Plato's Socrates was "the God" and the guarantor 
of unruffled beauty as "the truly divine" is absolutely no longer sufficient. 
We have now come to a crucial point in the thesis, where we must now consider, 
in some depth, Ratzinger’s theological perspective on the person of Jesus and the 
implications of revelation on the meaning of beauty. This will highlight again 
Ratzinger’s integration of philosophy and theology in a special relationship with 
each other, for it is precisely in their interrelation that he is able to offer a solution 
to the aesthetic problem at hand. 
A central theme in Ratzinger’s reflection on beauty is founded on Augustine’s 
description of a certain paradox that occurs in the scriptures.
256
 That is, the Psalms 
speak of Jesus as, “the fairest of the children of men and grace is poured upon 
your lips” (Psalm 44), and yet the book of Isaiah tells us that Jesus “had no beauty, 
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no majesty to draw our eyes, no grace to make us delight in him" (Isaiah 53).
257
 
These two passages describe the same person in the same event, namely, Jesus on 
the cross. The event of the cross involves a gruesome and ugly sight of a man 
with “no beauty, no majesty to draw our eyes”, but Christianity claims that this 
man is also God, the Supreme Beauty.
258
 Somehow the beautiful one is seen to 
have no beauty at all. The ugliness of death is not ignored, but overcome. 
Ratzinger interprets this as a paradox where a new understanding of beauty is to 
be “debated anew and suffered”.259  
This paradox of beauty is unheard of in ancient Greek philosophy, and is 
described by Augustine as a “beauty in righteousness”, a “beauty which seeks the 
eye of the heart”. 260  Since Jesus is “altogether just”, he is “altogether 
beautiful”.261 Reflecting on this, Ratzinger says, 
…this beauty is not simply a harmony of proportion and form; "the fairest 
of the sons of men" is also, mysteriously, the one "who had no form or 
comeliness that we should look at him, and no beauty that we should 
desire him". Jesus Christ shows us how the truth of love can transform 
even the dark mystery of death into the radiant light of the resurrection. 
Here the splendour of God's glory surpasses all worldly beauty. The truest 
beauty is the love of God, who definitively revealed himself to us in the 
paschal mystery.
262
 
The transcendental metaphysics of the philosophers is limited by its indifference 
to suffering and death, but the Beauty of Jesus transforms the ugliness of 
suffering and death by his love. Ratzinger reiterates this paradox as an answer to 
Adorno’s critique. Indeed, the ugliness of death, with all its shadows, 
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paradoxically points to the fact that nothing less than the brightness of love is able 
to overcome it.  
At the same time, Ratzinger recognizes that Adorno’s criticism of beautiful art 
has an element of moral concern for fellow man. As Ratzinger illustrates, 
When someone rejoices, he is afraid of offending against solidarity with 
the many people who suffer. I don’t have any right to rejoice, people think, 
in a world where there is so much misery, so much injustice.
263
 
However, Ratzinger asserts that this apparently well-intentioned attitude of 
denying joy for the sake of solidarity is simply “wrong” because in the end 
suffering is not the last word, but rather beauty and truth.
264
 A beauty which is the 
splendour of truth is a beauty that is love, a beauty that can be trusted. The love of 
God portrayed on the cross is the beauty that can give us hope and liberate us 
from the temptations of nihilism, and from which derives true freedom to love 
others.
265
 Ratzinger explains the situation this way: 
… in his Face that is so disfigured, there appears the genuine, extreme 
beauty: the beauty of love that goes "to the very end"; for this reason it is 
revealed as greater than falsehood and violence. Whoever has perceived 
this beauty knows that truth, and not falsehood, is the real aspiration of the 
world. It is not the false that is "true", but indeed, the Truth.
266
 
Christ’s love for man expressed in total sacrifice reveals the truth about beauty, 
and the beauty of truth. The truth concerning beauty as truth is manifest precisely 
in an event of suffering and despair, and we are unable to accept this truth without 
an amending our own attitude towards suffering. The only way to see this, the 
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only way to hold on to human solidarity with all its misery and yet truly rejoice, is 
to “obtain the resources to go on only from God”.267 Ratzinger therefore declares,  
Whoever believes in God, in the God who manifested himself, precisely in 
the altered appearance of Christ crucified as love "to the end" (John 13:1), 
knows that beauty is truth and truth beauty; but in the suffering Christ he 
also learns that the beauty of truth also embraces offence, pain, and even 
the dark mystery of death, and that this can only be found in accepting 
suffering, not in ignoring it.
268
 
This attitude can only come about by a transformation of the heart and not simply 
of the logical mind. Ratzinger explains that the reason for this is that a clever and 
logical answer to suffering never suffices: “No, the question can only be endured, 
suffered through—with him and at the side of him who suffered it to the end for 
all of us and with all of us”.269   
Ratzinger explains that “The Christian does not gloss over or deny the deep 
shadows that fall upon man’s existence in this world”. 270 In fact, according to 
Ratzinger, it is only those who accept their sufferings who can have a paradoxical 
joy in knowing that beauty is truth and that evil and suffering are not the 
fundamental realities of the world.
271
 He asserts that this joy,  
…reaches the roots of our existence and proves its strength not least in the 
fact that it sustains us when all else about us is darkness. Christian joy is 
                                                             
267 Benedict XVI and Seewald, Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic Church at the End 
of the Millennium, 37. 
268 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty," §5. 
269 Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 288.  
270 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 254. 
271
 Ibid. Here, Ratzinger uses the following imagery: “And yet these very shadows are also signs 
of hope for him, because he believes and, in believing, knows that they are shadows, which would 
not be there without the great light that casts them. And if the present belongs to the shadows, then 
the future is that much more in the possession of the light”. 
 70 
 
intended precisely also for those who labour and are heavy-burdened; 
those who have no reason to laugh here…272  
Ratzinger further notes that, “In this world of suffering, adoration has continued 
to rise up from the fiery furnaces of the crematories and not from the spectators of 
the horror”.273 On the other hand, the comfortable onlooker is prone to becoming 
guilty and embittered by the suffering of others. The suffering of others becomes 
overbearing when contrasted with the comforts of one’s own life so one can 
develop a distrust of a God who is both good and beautiful.
274
 Ratzinger therefore 
appeals to the reason of the heart, that in the midst of difficulties, one may find 
hope by the prayerful identification with the suffering figure on the cross. Faith 
plays a key part here because it is according to the faith that Jesus, who suffered 
thus, also rose from the dead and through his death reconciled the world to God. It 
is on account of this belief in the resurrection after death that the faithful can dare 
to proclaim that “love is stronger than death”, and so hold with certainty that 
beauty overcomes ugliness.
275
 Ratzinger further expounds:  
[It] is the true transformation which the world needs and which alone can 
redeem the world. Since Christ, in an act of love has transformed and 
defeated violence from within, death itself is transformed: love is stronger 
than death. It remains forever.
276
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The passionate and sacrificial love of God gives man the necessary hope to affirm 
the ultimate truth of beauty and love in the midst of suffering. Indeed, it is in this 
regard that Ratzinger accords with Dostoevsky’s famous words of hope, “Beauty 
will save the world”.277 As mentioned, Dostoevsky is for Ratzinger a source of 
philosophical and theological thinking, especially in regard to the implications of 
beauty experienced in the heart.
278
 In Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Prince Myshkin 
says to Rogozhin, “The essence of religious feeling does not depend on reason, 
and it has nothing to do with wrongdoing or crime or with atheism. There is 
something else there and there always will be, and atheists will always pass over 
it and will never be talking about that”.279 In the paradox of beauty – the death of 
Jesus depicts the beauty of love as truth, but this paradox is insurmountable by 
positivistic limitations on reason or the denial of love by a false preference for the 
violent and ugly. Ratzinger, along with Pope Francis, surmises: 
… it is precisely in contemplating Jesus’ death that faith grows stronger 
and receives a dazzling light; then it is revealed as faith in Christ’s 
                                                             
277 This is expressed in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot when Hyppolyte makes an observation concerning 
the painting, “The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb”, by Hans Holbein the Younger. 
Hyppolyte says: “It is strange to look on this dreadful picture of the mangled corpse of the Saviour, 
and to put this question to oneself: "Supposing that the disciples, the future apostles, the women 
who had followed Him and stood by the cross, all of whom believed in and worshiped Him -- 
supposing that they saw this tortured body, this face so mangled and bleeding and bruised (and 
they must have so seen it) -- how could they have gazed upon the dreadful sight and yet have 
believed that He would rise again?” (Translation by Eva Martin, Part III, Ch. 6). This reaction 
from Hyppolyte may be a clue to the experience of Dostoevsky himself when contemplating the 
suffering and death of Christ in the same painting. We know from the account of Dostoevsky’s 
wife that when they went to see the painting together, Dostoevsky was so overcome by the 
painting that he had to sit down and she became worried for him in case it might bring on a seizure 
– Predrag Cicovacki, Dostoevsky and the Affirmation of Life (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2012). 
278 "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty," §22. 
279 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot, trans. Henry Carlisle and Olga Andreyev Carlisle (New York; 
London: Signet Classics, 1978), 241; Cf. Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 302. 
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steadfast love for us, a love capable of embracing death to bring us 
salvation.
280
 
This understanding of beauty can only be supported by faith and personal 
suffering. These are related because suffering purifies the heart and allows one to 
understand better the love shown in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Ratzinger 
expresses that this realisation is the fundamental kernel of joy in life, and stands 
in contradistinction to Nietzsche’s distaste for Christian sacrifice. He says, 
The Cross, which was for Nietzsche the most detestable expression of the 
negative character of the Christian religion, is in truth the centre of the 
evangelium, the glad tidings: “It is good that you exist” – no, “It is 
necessary that you exist.” The Cross is the approbation of our existence, 
not in words, but in an act so completely radical that it caused God to 
become flesh and pierced this flesh to the quick; that, to God, it was worth 
the death of his incarnate Son. One who is so loved that the other 
identifies his life with this love and no longer desires to live if he is 
deprived of it; one who is loved even unto death— such a one knows that 
he is truly loved. But if God so loves us, then we are loved in truth. Then 
love is truth, and truth is love. Then life is worth living.
281
 
Whereas Nietszche points to eros as the primary form of love, Christian joy is 
founded on a love that is both eros and agape. Ratzinger formulates this precise 
relationship of hope with beauty, recalling Pope Paul VI’s words to artists at the 
close of the Second Vatican Council,  
This world in which we live needs beauty in order not to sink into despair. 
Beauty, like truth, brings joy to the human heart, and is that precious fruit 
which resists the erosion of time, which unites generations and enables 
them to be one in admiration.
282
 
                                                             
280
 Pope Francis, "Lumen Fidei," §16. This encyclical was co-written by Joseph Ratzinger - Cf. 
Gerhard L.  Müller, "Presentation of the Encyclical Letter of Pope Francis Lumen Fidei,"  (2013). 
281 Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 81. 
282 Quoted in Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel." 
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Meanwhile, the cult of the ugly opposes joy as if it was only fit for the foolish and 
the gullible. Adorno suggests that the idea of eternal joy is a crude joke when we 
face the overwhelming evils of suffering in human history.
283
 Ratzinger’s 
presentation of beauty as relating to the salvation of the world is not simply 
intended to subdue cynicism and pessimism, but stands for something positive, 
something absolutely real and tangible. Beauty reveals that joy is possible, not by 
ignoring death but by overcoming it by love, and this is why we can have hope in 
suffering.  
 
3.2.3  A New Understanding of Being  
 
By these reflections, Ratzinger suggests that the Ancient Greek understanding of 
beauty is inadequate precisely on account of their limited theological scope. The 
unchangeable, transcendent and perfect form of beauty is for the Greeks based on 
the unchangeable, transcendent and perfect God of being in combination with the 
refined mythical form of Apollo. According to Ratzinger, the Ancient Greek 
understanding of God as being is helpful and necessary to understand the 
Christian God, who is indeed Being, Truth, Goodness and Beauty. As discussed 
earlier, the knowledge of being bestowed by the encounter with beauty is already 
purported by Plato to be synonymous with a kind of love.
284
 However, these 
metaphysical principles fall short of depicting the God who is also person.  
Christian theology, by engaging with Ancient Greek metaphysics, reveals that the 
transcendent being that irrupts in the splendour of the form, is not an impersonal 
reality, but an encounter with the person of Jesus himself “who has smitten them 
with this longing. It is he who has sent a ray of his beauty into their eyes”.285 In 
this way, Ratzinger ties the philosophical account of transcendental convertibility 
with the perception and knowledge of a paradoxical beauty of love in the person 
of Jesus.  
                                                             
283 Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift, 152-53. 
284 Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §7.  
285 Ibid. Ratzinger quotes from Nicholas Cabasilas, Life in Christ, II, 15. 
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Christianity gives a new perspective on beauty. This is the beauty of Jesus, the 
beauty of love which radiates truth and goodness. According to Ratzinger, this is 
possible because God is both love and logos: “The God of faith, as thought, is 
also love”.286 He continues, “the creative original thought, is at the same time 
love”, such that “truth and love are originally identical; that where they are 
completely realized they are not two parallel or even opposing realities but one, 
the one and only absolute”.287 In other words, God is love precisely as he is 
reason. As such, the Christian understanding of reason culminates in the divine 
person of Jesus: “The world comes from reason and this reason is a Person, is 
Love”.288 Being, truth and logos, each of these then is also convertible with love.  
If the same love represents the desire and love for the truth, then this must have 
implications for the way we understanding the acquirement of knowledge. This 
confirms Augustine’s notion that when one loves something he “seeks for its 
face”.289 Ratzinger develops on this by explaining that “to love means wishing to 
know”, and that this drive is integral to accepting the truth.290 In order to attain 
true knowledge, we must first love the truth and seek it with all our heart, which 
implies the need for sacrifice, as Ratzinger explains: 
Only by understanding do I receive reality at all; and understanding, in 
turn, depends on a certain measure of inner identification with what is to 
be understood. It depends on love. I cannot really understand something 
for which I have no love whatsoever. So the transmission of the message 
needs more than the kind of memory that stores telephone numbers: what 
                                                             
286 Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 148. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid., 27.  
289 Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 361. 
290 Ibid. The extended quote reads: “To love means wishing to know, and so the search for insight 
can be an inner drive towards love. To put it another way, there is a link between love and truth, 
which is significant for both philosophy and theology … Christian faith can say of itself: I have 
found love. But the love for Christ and for one’s neighbour for the sake of Christ can only have 
stability when it is, at base, love of the truth”. 
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is requires is a memory of the heart, in which I invest something of 
myself.
291
  
For Ratzinger, the greatest knowledge concerns the question, “how can God enter 
into the human spirit?”, and it is in approaching this knowledge, whether “from 
the concept of God or from the nature of man,” which “leads us to the most 
profound depth of our understanding of reality per se”.292  It is only by loving, 
then, that we can have insight into the nature of beauty as love and truth in the 
person of Jesus. He is both the beauty of eros which is manifest in his yearning 
love to redeem mankind, and also the beauty of agape, as the person who loves to 
the very end. Jesus loves by embracing suffering and so reveals what is truly 
beautiful and human. One accepts the same beauty conferred in the loving act of 
Jesus by emulating his love, both in eros and agape. That is, by a life of love and 
sacrifice. Beauty, then, calls out to all to respond to this love by exercising their 
freedom for the good, and in this way, it offers to make man beautiful and whole. 
For Ratzinger, the saint becomes the epitome of ugliness to the world in his self-
renunciation, but by precisely the same act of love he becomes eminently 
beautiful as he reflects the true beauty of God.
 293
 
 
3.2.4  Being-from and Being-for 
 
Beauty is convertible with being and yet beauty is also person. This is founded on 
Ratzinger’s understanding of being as relation. Ratzinger explains that the 
Christian God remains “the highest possibility of Being”, and this “highest mode 
of Being includes the element of relationship”. 294 Ratzinger continues, “Being no 
longer appears as absolute, enclosed autarchy but turns out to be at the same time 
                                                             
291 Seek That Which Is Above : Meditations through the Year (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 
101. 
292 Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 343. 
293 "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §21. 
294 Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 148. Cf. pp. 129-130.  
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involvement, creative power, which creates and bears and loves other things…”295 
This points to the distinction between what is conceived as Being of the ancient 
philosophers and God as Being in Christian thought. Ratzinger asks, 
Is the God who names himself and has a name, the God who helps and is 
always there, radically different from the esse subsistens, the absolute 
Being, that is discovered in the lonely silence of philosophical speculation, 
or what?
296
  
This is elucidated in Ratzinger’s analysis of the nature of persons. He writes, 
“Person” in God is the pure relativity of being turned toward each other; it 
is situated, not on the level of substance – the substance is one- but rather 
on the level of dialogue, of being related to one another… the Christian 
faith gave birth to this idea of pure actuality, of pure relativity, which does 
not lie on the level of substance and does not affect or divide the substance 
per se, and thus brought the personal phenomenon plainly into view.
297
 
Ratzinger further explains that the three Persons of the Trinity “are not substances 
alongside one another; rather, they are nothing other than actual, real relations”, 
such that “In God, person means relation. … the Person exists by his very nature 
only as relation”.298 Regarding this, Ratzinger refers to Richard of St Victor who 
points out that “person” is not in the realm of essence but rather “on the level of 
existence”.299  
Ratzinger suggests that being as person is also “Being from and for someone”.300 
When this is applied to man, it explains “the unique structure of the soul, which 
can exist only in the manner of dialogue and freedom”. It gives a clue to how the 
                                                             
296 Ibid., 130. 
296 Ibid., 130. 
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 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 187. 
298 Ibid., 186. Here, Ratzinger is reflecting on Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity.  
299 Ibid., 190. 
300 Ibid., 282. 
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beauty of participation in being, convertible with truth and goodness, may also 
simultaneously be a beauty that is personal love.
301
  
Ratzinger points out, however, that it is common to hear the false notion that man 
is a product of his own freedom, which stems from Sartre’s concept of freedom as 
one of absolute self-determination.
302
 It is a freedom loosed from any sense of 
boundary which is associated with the idea that praxis has potential to become 
progress.
303
 Expressions of art with a radically inflated emphasis on subjectivism 
such as deconstructive or anarchistic art theories are often founded on this empty 
notion of freedom where, in fact, the subject himself is lost.
304
  
The falsity of this claim can be established simply by considering the fact that 
man is not “free” to live longer than his nature allows. Man is mortal and this 
reality cannot be changed by self-determination. This problem will remain as long 
as freedom is equated with complete autonomy, which usually chooses to ignore 
this fact altogether since the depressing reality of death steers one from 
confronting it in thought thereby allowing one to fall into the comfort of 
perceived self-sufficiency, into his own “little immortality”.305 Death reveals that 
a person’s existence is contingent on another, and this dependency reveals that 
relationship is the principle by which human beings exist as persons.  
In presenting this idea of person, Ratzinger refers to the concept of the I-Thou, 
introduced by Ferdinand Ebner and developed on by Martin Buber. Buber’s 
notion of the I-Thou stipulates that a person is only insofar as he is an I in 
communication with a Thou. More precisely, man discovers that his own being is 
made for relation when he experiences the God as other and subsequently 
recognizes that the capacity to know this other can only derive from self-
                                                             
301 Ibid., 153. Ratzinger refers to Bonaventure’s view that “a merely natural soul is inconceivable; 
an essential of the soul is that it cannot subsist in itself alone. It must be preserved by something 
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302 "Truth and Freedom," 28-29. 
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 A Turning Point for Europe?: The Church in the Modern World : Assessment and Forecast 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), 95. 
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realisation. Accordingly, the first and fundamental relationship for man is with 
God, the eternal-Thou.
306
 In line with this, Ratzinger suggests that it is when one 
realises himself in dialogue with God that he begins to know himself more 
completely, for “man himself is the place in which and through which he 
experiences God”.307  
Moreover, Ratzinger reveals that being-as-relation has further consequences when 
it expresses the communal reality of God as Trinity and man as collective species. 
That is, between God and man, there is an element of plurality on both sides as 
God is not simply a person, but precisely persons (of the Trinity), and man is not 
only an individual but man in the community of the human race.
308
 Therefore, 
man’s relationship with God is not exhausted by the I-Thou relationship alone, but 
must also encompass an element of We-We.
309
 Finally, as man is to be understood 
as being in relation to the plurality of persons in the Trinity, not only from the 
perspective of the individual, but also in light of man as part of the human race, 
we can recognize our nature as being-from and being-for implies a relationship of 
communal love.  
For Ratzinger, man is finite whether considered as individual or as species, 
however, the relationship that exists between the We of man and the We of God 
guarantees man’s dignity. Ratzinger says,  
Of all creatures God loves man in a special way and confers upon him an 
extraordinary dignity, giving him that glory which the rebellious angels 
lost. The human race may thus be counted as the tenth choir of the angelic 
                                                             
306 Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 189. Reflecting on these 
thoughts of Buber, Ratzinger adds, “Perhaps that is even the real distinction between the human 
mind and other forms of consciousness found in animals: the fact that the human mind can think 
about the wholly other, the concept of God” (ibid.). 
307 Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 354.  
308 Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 195. 
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 Ibid., 195-96. Ratzinger suggests that the notion of the we-we relationship between God and 
man has largely been lost. Even an individualised aspect of relationship in the I-Thou barely 
remains since after Kant the I-Thou is absorbed into the single I of the “transcendental 
consciousness”. For Kant, beauty is deprived of its objectivity let alone its identity with love. 
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hierarchy. Indeed human beings are able to know God in himself, that is, 
his one nature in the Trinity of Persons.
310
   
The relationship between the persons of the Trinity is that of love, and so it is this 
love that analogously defines the nature of the intrinsic relationship between man 
and fellow man. In other words, the truth of our being is first and foremost 
realised in our existence as persons who are loved and are made for loving. It is 
only in accordance with our nature as being-in-relation that we can respond to 
God’s love with our own love for him and for others.  
Ratzinger points out that of all the philosophers it is the atheist Ludwig Feuerbach 
who recognizes this we of man.
311
 Individual man attains to his grandeur only 
insofar as he is communal man. However, Feuerbach goes further than identifying 
the finitude of individuality because he proposes the absoluteness of man as 
species, and in this claim to absoluteness through community Feuerbach 
deliberately excludes humanity’s relationship with God.312  
The significance of this for the understanding of beauty is that, for Feuerbach, 
beauty only amounts to a sign of man’s love for himself as a species, whereas for 
Ratzinger, the role and effect of beauty is proportional to its capacity to facilitate 
for man the experience of the dialogical relationship with the Thou in the 
Trinitarian God. Furthermore, beauty also signifies plurality in unity since God 
exists as community of the Trinity, and man correspondingly finds himself in 
community as species. 
Ultimately, for Ratzinger, both beauty and being converge in the relationship that 
is God as persons. Beauty is truth and love, and these are not concepts in a 
                                                             
310 Benedict XVI, "Proclaiming Saint Hildegard of Bingen, Professed Nun of the Order of Saint 
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311 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, 196. 
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vacuum, but rather “have a face and a name. They issue a call to us. For they are 
‘Love’, that is to say, a person”. 313  The potency of beauty is realized in the 
encounter with this person, the eternal-Thou, who is intuited as someone distinct 
from the I, but which then reveals the I in greater depth, that is, of man as being in 
communion with each other and with God. This is what moves one to the 
conviction of truth, a “Conversio (‘conversion’, metanoia)” to a more certain 
knowledge of reality.
314
 The experience of beauty confers this valuable 
knowledge and so represents the surpassing of each individual’s search for the 
meaning of his own existence as being-in-relation, as being-from and being-for; 
loved and free to love. 
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Conclusion 
 
Ratzinger observes that today beauty is often used and manipulated for power and 
gain.
315
 Although the corruption of beauty and the atrocities of human history 
might seem to support the cynical view that considers beauty a wasteful deception 
and even recommends ugliness as the ultimate foundation of reality, Ratzinger’s 
aesthetics is able to respond to these challenges. By combining both philosophical 
and theological insights as well as reflecting on his own experience of beauty, 
Ratzinger presents a renewed understanding of beauty that culminates in its 
identification with truth and love. Beauty is not simply a judgment of taste that 
changes according to whether the observer feels pleasure in it. It is a metaphysical 
reality that has precedence over man. Ratzinger wishes to express this truth about 
beauty, and even more, to build a religious and cultural environment where 
beauty is cherished as a way to communicate with God, the supreme Beauty.  
An important point in his presentation of beauty is that beauty concerns not only 
eros, which is enkindled by the reasoned forms, but also agape. Plato explains 
that beauty is not simply external for he also believes that the beautiful forms of 
visible things participate in invisible beauty. In other words, it is through the 
external things, not as an end but as a means, that we fly unto the unchanging 
eternal Beauty. However, it is clear that when burdened by the ugliness of human 
weakness and the certainty of death, an understanding of beauty limited to its 
Apollonian appearance is unable to seed a hope proper to existence as contained 
in the Christian message. The external form of the cross reveals then an internal 
beauty.  
Ratzinger explains, however, that this internal beauty is the same beauty manifest 
in the logos, which reveals itself in the mangled body of the crucifix. Beauty, in 
its primary sense then, is a person, Jesus Christ, who loves by both eros and 
agape. This beauty of love is the foundation of reality, which means that beauty 
reigns supreme and overshadows all the moral ugliness of history. 
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The passion of Christ makes this possible – and this is a point that is certainly 
given greater clarity in light of philosophical aesthetics. This points again to a 
theme so significant in Ratzinger’s works: the relationship between philosophy 
and theology. Indeed, Ratzinger makes these points about the beauty of Christ 
because he stays open to the pertinent philosophical arguments concerning beauty 
in philosophy in addition to his own reflections on real personal experiences of 
beauty. 
Furthermore, according to Ratzinger, the beauty of Christ makes beautiful all who 
model their life on the same beauty of love.
316
 It is important to embrace the role 
of eros in such a life, which goes against Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
Christian life as essentially representing aestheticism whereby eros is completely 
destroyed.
317
 Ratzinger explains that the eros of Christianity is one that is purified 
and proves its value by stimulating the elevation of man in his quest for union 
with the divine.
318
 Eros, which is built up and nurtured in a culture of beauty in 
full accordance with love and truth, is also ordered towards the unification of the 
internal structure of man’s being, such that his spirit and body, intellect, will and 
sentiment are united in the “all-embracing act of love”.319 To unite one’s own 
being with love means to unite the intellect and will with that of God. One can 
then “see from the perspective of Jesus”, and so perceive “beyond external 
appearances”.320 At this point, eros transforms into agape, so that one can say “I 
love even the person whom I do not like or even know”.321 Indeed, agape is not 
the kind of love that looks inwardly at one’s own life, but a love that is willing to 
give up one’s life for another.  
Ratzinger explains that the theological tradition of the Trinity as persons reveals 
that being is relational at its core and that this relationship is one of love. In order 
to reflect the beauty that is the divine being, one must reflect the relationship of 
                                                             
316 Spargo, The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure, 43. 
317 Benedict XVI, "Deus Caritas Est". §3. 
318
 Ratzinger, "Liturgy and Sacred Music," 386. 
319 Benedict XVI, "Deus Caritas Est". §17. 
320 Ibid., §18. 
321 Ibid. 
 83 
 
love that is God, and this involves the knowledge that love involves suffering.
322
 
This is because the metaphysical dimension of beauty as being-in-relation 
coincides with the understanding of beauty as agape expressed in the God who 
suffers and dies. 
Ultimately, in presenting the paradoxical notion of the suffering beauty which is 
at once both truth and goodness, Ratzinger does not aim to give a simple formula 
that makes sense of beauty once and for all. In fact, by means of the paradox 
Ratzinger tells us that the reality of beauty is beyond our capacity to define it 
precisely because beauty is a person. However, this also means that we can know 
beauty personally in our hearts, which is not at all irrational, since this beauty is 
the person of logos. As such, beauty teaches us that reason does not preclude 
feeling and experience. 
Whereas Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche focus on the immanent quality of the 
experience of the beautiful, Ratzinger ascribes to the Platonic-Augustinian 
tradition where the experience of beauty is understood to take us into a 
transcendental realm. At the same time, we remain in this world and come to 
know it better.  
A true knowledge of being cannot be expressed or acquired through logical 
concepts alone, but it can be known precisely by the effect of beauty on the 
heart.
323
 This points to a heart that is able to grasp reality with an expanded reason, 
one which does not lock beauty away in the limitations of philosophical discourse, 
but one which remains open to the broad experience of reality.  
This openness of the heart means that it is not primarily the case that we “judge” 
beauty in an active sense, but rather we “experience” it in a passive sense. That is, 
beauty itself is to be considered active and the observer passive. Beauty shocks us 
and we are left emotionally and spiritually disturbed by the burning desire that it 
instils in our hearts.
324
 Now, when the heart is so moved by beauty it desires to 
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unite itself to it, and by remaining open to the reality of beauty, the heart begins to 
see the truth in an intuitive way. Ratzinger proposes that in following this path of 
beauty, one can become convinced of the reality of God as truth and love in his 
overwhelming goodness. This truth is revealed each time beauty is encountered 
with a well-disposed heart. 
In his aesthetics, Ratzinger rejects the theories that construe beauty as being 
merely an irrational sentiment, or a product of the subjective mind, or an element 
of the will to power, or a façade of a primal ugliness. It is by reflecting on the 
impact of beauty on his heart, as well as seriously considering the joint 
contribution of philosophy and theology that allows Ratzinger to reject these 
contrary theories and maintain his metaphysical view of beauty, which is truth 
and goodness and at the same time the suffering love of God. 
 
 
 
  
 85 
 
References 
 
Primary Sources by Ratzinger: 
 
Ratzinger, Joseph. Behold the Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual 
Christology.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986. 
———. "Christian Universalism: On Two Collections of Papers by Hans Urs 
Von Balthasar." In Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Volume 1, Unity of the 
Church, edited by David L Schindler, 131-43. Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 2010. 
———. Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2006. 
———. "Conscience and Truth." Communio 37, no. 3 (2010): 529-38. 
———. Credo for Today: What Christians Believe. Translated by Michael J. 
Miller.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009. 
———. "Culture and Truth: Some Reflections on the Encyclical Letter, Fides Et 
Ratio." The Patrician, February 1999. 
———. Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life. 
Ignatius Press, 2011. 
———. Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life. Translated by Michael Waldstein. 
2nd ed.  Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2007. 
———. "Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity." Lecture at the bishops' 
conference of the region of Campania in Benevento, (2002). Sunday 2 
June 2002. 
———. "Faith, Philosophy and Theology." Communio: International Catholic 
Review 11, no. 4 (1984): 351-63. 
———. The Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy.  San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986. 
———. "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty." Message to the 
Communion and Liberation (CL) meeting at Rimini (24-30 August, 2002). 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_co
n_cfaith_doc_20020824_ratzinger-cl-rimini_en.html. 
 86 
 
———. "Foreword." In The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich Von Hildebrand : A 
Biography, edited by Alice Von Hildebrand, 9-12. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2000. 
———. "Funeral Homily for Msgr. Luigi Giussani." Communio 31, no. 4 (2004): 
685-87. 
———. "Liturgy and Sacred Music." 13, no. 4 (1986): 377-91. 
———. Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental 
Theology.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987. 
———. "Sacramentum Caritatis." Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, (2007). 
22 February 2007. 
———. Seek That Which Is Above : Meditations through the Year.  San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1986. 
———. The Spirit of the Liturgy.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press 2000. 
———. "Truth and Freedom." Communio 23, no. 1 (1996): 16-35. 
———. A Turning Point for Europe?: The Church in the Modern World : 
Assessment and Forecast.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010. 
———. "Wounded by the Arrow of Beauty: The Cross and the New ‘Aesthetics’ 
of Faith." In On the Way to Jesus Christ. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2005. 
 
 
Benedict XVI. "Address to the Participants of the Annual Plenary Assembly of 
the Pontifical Council for Social Communications." 2007. 
———. "Apostolic Journey to France." General Audience, (2008). 17 September 
2008. 
———. "Apostolic Journey to Santiago De Compostela and Barcelona - 
Eucharistic Celebration on the Occasion of the Dedication of the Church 
of the Sagrada Familia and the Altar in Barcelona." Homily, (2010). 7 
November 2010. 
———. "Art and Prayer." General Audience at Castel Gandolfo, (2011). 
Wednesday, 31 August 2011. 
———. "Deus Caritas Est." Encyclical, (2005). 
 87 
 
———. "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections." Lecture of 
the Holy Father. Apostolic Journey to Munchen, Altotting and Regensburg: 
Meeting with the representatives of science in the Aula Magna of the 
University of Regensburg (September 12, 2006). 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html. 
———. Introduction to Christianity.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004. 
———. "Meeting of the Holy Father Benedict Xvi with the Clergy of the Diocese 
of Bolzano-Bressanone." (2008). 
———. "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel." Vatican Publishing House, 
2009. 
———. "Message for the 41st World Communications Day: Children and the 
Media - a Challenge for Education." Vatican Publishing House, 2007. 
———. "Message of His Holiness Benedict Xvi to Archbishop Gianfranco 
Ravasi, President of the Pontifical Council for Culture on the Occasion of 
the 13th Public Conference of the Pontifical Academies on the Theme: 
'The Universality of Beauty: A Comparison between Aesthetics and 
Ethics'." 2008. 
———. "Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict Xvi for the Twenty-Sixth 
World Youth Day (2011) on August 6, 2010." Vatican Publishing House, 
2010. 
———. "Message of the Holy Father for the 49th World Day of Prayer for 
Vocations."  (2011). 
———. "Proclaiming Saint Hildegard of Bingen, Professed Nun of the Order of 
Saint Benedict, a Doctor of the Universal Church." Apostolic 
Letter,(2012). 
———. "Saint Augustine of Hippo (5)." General Audience, 5 (2008). 27 
February 2008. 
———. "Saint Justin, Philosopher and Martyr." General Audience, (2007). 
Wednesday, 21 March 2007. 
———. "Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)." General Audience,(2010). 16 June 2010. 
 88 
 
———. "Spe Salvi." Encyclical, (2007). November 30, 2007. 
———. "Visit to the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart on the Occasion of 
the 50th Anniversary of the Faculty of Medicine and Surgery of the 
Agostino Gemelli Polyclinic." (2012). Thursday, 3 May 2012. 
———. "The Year of Faith. The Desire for God.", General Audience, (2012). 
Wednesday, 7 November 2012. 
Benedict XVI, and Peter Seewald. Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic 
Church at the End of the Millennium.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997. 
 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor.  
London; New York: Continuum, 2002. 
———. History and Freedom Lectures 1964-1965.  Hoboken: Wiley, 2014. 
———. Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. 
Jephcott.  London; New York: Verso, 1978. 
———. Prisms.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1982. 
Allen, John L. Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger.  New York: 
Continuum, 2000. 
Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Glory of the Lord : A Theological Aesthetics. 
Volume 2: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles.  San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2006. 
———. The Glory of the Lord a Theological Aesthetics. Vol. 4.  Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1989. 
———. The Glory of the Lord, a Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form.  San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982. 
Bayoumi, Moustafa. "Reconciliation without Duress: Said, Adorno, and the 
Autonomous Intellectual". Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, no. 25 
(2005): 46-64. 
Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man [in German]. Translated by Ronald Gregor 
Smith.  London: Routledge & Paul, 1949. 
 89 
 
Bychkov, Oleg. Aesthetic Revelation: Reading Ancient and Medieval Texts after 
Hans Urs Von Balthasar.  Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2010. 
Campodonico, Angelo. "Hans Urs Von Balthasar’s Interpretation of the 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas." Nova et Vetera 8 (2010): 33-53. 
Cicovacki, Predrag. Dostoevsky and the Affirmation of Life.  New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2012. 
Dadosky, John D. The Eclipse and Recovery of Beauty: A Lonergan Approach.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014. 
Daniels, Paul Raimond. Nietzsche and the Birth of Tragedy. 2013. 
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Idiot. Translated by Henry Carlisle and Olga Andreyev 
Carlisle.  New York; London: Signet Classics, 1978. 
———. The Karamazov Brothers.  London: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2007. 
Elders, Leo. The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas: In a Historical 
Perspective. Translated by John Dudley. E.J. Brill, 1993. 
Fields, Stephen. "The Beauty of the Ugly: Balthasar, the Crucifixion, Analogy 
and God." International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 2 (2007): 
172-83. 
Pope Francis. "Lumen Fidei." Encyclical,(2013). 29 June 2013. 
Gaál, Emery de. The Theology of Pope Benedict Xvi: The Christocentric Shift. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Giussani, Luigi. The Religious Sense.  Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press 1997. 
Grabowski, Francis A. Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms. Continuum, 2008. 
Guardini, Romano. The Focus of Freedom .  Baltimore: Helicon, 1966. 
———. Pascal for Our Time.  New York: Herder and Herder, 1966. 
———. Romano Guardini: Spiritual Writings. Translated by Robert A. Krieg.  
Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2005. 
———. The Spirit of the Liturgy.  London: Sheed & Ward, 1937. 
Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Taste. 2nd ed.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
———. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality.  
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 90 
 
———. Knowledge, Reason, and Taste Kant's Response to Hume.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Harrison, Carol. Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine.  
Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Hildebrand, Dietrich von. What Is Philosophy? : Franciscan Herald Press, 1973. 
Hoeckner, Berthold. Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth 
Century Music.  New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Hohendahl, Peter Uwe. The Fleeting Promise of Art Adorno's Aesthetic Theory 
Revisited .  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
Kenny, Anthony. A New History of Western Philosophy.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
Kissler, Alexander. Der Deutsche Papst : Benedikt XVI. Und Seine Schwierige 
Heimat [in German].  Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005. 
Lubac, Henri de. The Drama of Atheist Humanism.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1995. 
Maritain, Jacques. Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry. Translated 
by J. W. Evans. New York: Scribner & Sons. 
Maurer, Armand A. About beauty: a Thomistic interpretation. Houston, Texas: 
Center for Thomistics Studies, University of St. Thomas: 1983. 
Müller, Gerhard L. "Presentation of the Encyclical Letter of Pope Francis Lumen 
Fidei." (2013). 5 July 2013. 
Nichols, Aidan. The Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic 
Thought from Hermes to Benedict XVI. Hildenbrand Books, 2011. 
———. "Redeeming Beauty Soundings in Sacral Aesthetics." Ashgate. 
———. "The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of 
Joseph Ratzinger." Burns & Oates. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
———. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs.  
New York: Vintage Books, 1974. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, 
Schopenhauer, and Dionysus." In Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts, 
 91 
 
edited by Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell and Daniel W. Conway, 36-69. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Pieper, Josef. Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue 
Phaedrus. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston.  South Bend: St 
Augustine's Press, 2000. 
———. For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy.  San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006. 
———. In Defense of Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern 
Challenges.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992. 
———. Living the Truth.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989. 
Pontifical Council for Culture,. "Concluding Document of the Plenary Assembly: 
The Via Pulchritudinis, Privileged Pathway for Evangelization and 
Dialogue." 2006. 
Pontynen, Arthur. For the Love of Beauty: Art, History, and the Moral 
Foundations of Aesthetic Judgment.  New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 2006. 
Roberts, David. Art and Enlightenment: Aesthetic Theory after Adorno.  Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2006. 
Rowland, Tracey. Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed.  London; New York: 
T & T Clark, 2010. 
———. Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
———. "The Role of Natural Law and Natural Right in the Search for a 
Universal Ethic." In Searching for a Universal Ethic: Multidisciplinary, 
Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law 
Tradition, edited by J. Berkman and W.C. Mattison, 156-66: Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2014. 
Schindler, David C. "Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of 
onto-Theology." Analecta Hermeneutica 1, no. 1 (2009): 102-13. 
Schindler, David C. Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: 
A Philosophical Investigation. Fordham University Press, 2004. 
 92 
 
———. "‘Wie Kommt Der Mensch in Die Theologie?’: Heidegger, Hegel, and 
the Stakes of onto-Theo-Logy." Communio 32, no. 4 (2005): 637-68. 
Spargo, Emma Jane Marie. The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of 
Saint Bonaventure.  St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953. 
Young, Julian. "Richard Wagner and the Birth of the Birth of Tragedy 1". 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16, no. 2 (2008): 217-45. 
Zangwill, Nick. "Aesthetic Realism 1." In The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, 
edited by Jerrold Levinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
 
